The commentary surrounding the release of the UK’s latest Strategic Defence Review (SDR) concentrated on its least interesting feature. The review is written on the assumption that during the next Parliament the share of GDP devoted to defence will rise to three per cent. The British government has endorsed this target without quite promising that it will be reached, because they can’t be sure of the state of the economy in five years time, or for that matter the international situation.

We should in fact be interrogating the most important recommendations in the review, all of which require prompt implementation. The strong impression it conveyed is that in two key and linked respects the Ministry of Defence is not fit for purpose. The first is that it has a peacetime mentality, as if it allows itself to take any amount of time to decide awkward issues, and that, second, this problem is most evident when it comes to procurement. The independent reviewers responsible for the report, Lord George Robertson, General Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill, insist that the challenge posed by the continuing Russo-Ukrainian war and the readiness of Moscow to think and act as if it is already in a wider conflict with the West mean a wartime mentality is needed right now.

Even taking a relaxed view of the Russian threat, the advantage of a wartime mentality lies in the sense of urgency it introduces, and the readiness it encourages to push aside unnecessary bureaucratic barriers. The work already conducted with the Ukrainian armed forces has demonstrated the benefits. This requires a more risk-taking approach from both government and industry: much of the report is about how this can be encouraged. One only needs to look at the number of iterations of drone warfare over the course of the Russo-Ukraine War, now used by both sides with more range, accuracy, and stealth than ever before, and in huge numbers. If the normal processes had been followed by the time the initial requirements for a new system were generated, contracts agreed and then manufacture allowed, real-time operational experience would have moved on out of all recognition.

One feature of Ukraine’s fighting is its increasing digitisation. That leads to a proposal in the SDR for the early introduction of a ‘digital targeting web’ that will connect ‘sensors’, ‘deciders’, and ‘effectors’ to maximise their impact. This is part of a general push for a much more integrated force, moving beyond the current ‘jointery’ that allows the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force to keep their strong separate identities while encouraging closer cooperation.

Another priority that stems from a wartime mindset is to pay attention to what the review calls the ‘foundational capabilities’ that have been neglected to find funds for the more high-profile and exciting bits of kit. This is one of the key passages in the review:

A focus on ‘exquisite’ capabilities has masked the ‘hollowing out’ of the Armed Forces’ warfighting capability. Stockpiles are inadequate, further reduced by the important and necessary transfer of materiel to Ukraine. The Strategic Base lacks capacity and resilience following years of underinvestment. Medical services remain optimised for counter-terrorism operations and lack the capacity for managing a mass-casualty conflict.

To this can be added the chronic problem of recruitment and retention of personnel, so that even with a desire to raise numbers the first task is to stop the decline.

The focus on these aspects of defence is welcome and overdue. Whatever the contingencies to be faced, a timely and substantial response requires having enough people, properly trained and supported, and with appropriate kit.

It will also be important not to assume that the model of contemporary warfare coming out of Ukraine – with small-scale engagements because large concentrations of forces are too dangerous, a growing role for drones, artillery still vital but requiring large-scale production of shells, and armoured vehicles less prominent, intensive use of ordnance and all action pulled together by digital means – is valid in all circumstances. This is quite context-dependent, with large armies already mobilised and support systems established. In conflicts beyond Ukraine, where forces are more thinly spread and where there are gaps in drone and other forms of surveillance, then more classical military manoeuvres might be possible. This war has also demonstrated the potential damage caused by long-range strikes, raising challenges for air defences as well as for social resilience. These are matters raised in the review and will provide some of the major items for the more medium-term investments.

The enthusiasm and energy with which the review’s recommendations are embraced over the short-term will shape the ability of the Ministry of Defence to take advantage of extra resources, assuming they will still be available over the long-term for these investments. One problem the Ministry of Defence has in its dealings with the Treasury is its long record of equipment programmes that have arrived late and well over budget. That opens it up to the charge of inefficiency and wastefulness with public funds. The basic problem is that UK forces have been hollowed out over many years. It will take time and money to fill them out, but, given the urgency of the situation in Europe, the review was right to concentrate on getting the foundational capabilities in place as soon as possible.