Israel’s war against the Islamic Revolution in Iran could soon become Syria’s problem, but it is not Syria’s problem yet. Just over six months ago, the regime of Bashar al-Assad collapsed and the dictator fled. What followed was regime formation at top speed, with many hurdles — expected and unexpected — which the new interim authorities have not always managed to avoid gracefully.

The new Syrian government, led by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known under his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), is opposed by both Israel and Iran.

Iran backed the former regime of Bashar al-Assad. It fought in Syria with its special forces and foreign operations-focused Revolutionary Guards; and it sent its proxy Shia militias into Syria to kill and die on Assad’s behalf. Hezbollah alone, the Lebanese Iranian proxy and ally, sent tens of thousands of fighters into Syria over the civil war’s 14 years. It was Hezbollah who mounted the siege of Madaya, which ended in starvation and torture. Other Iranian-sponsored militias used southern Syria as their staging post, setting up bases and the capacity to strike Israel with missiles and drones across the occupied Golan Heights, which Israel defended by periodically, and for years, striking groups allied to Iran inside Syria.

The overthrow of Assad and the eclipsing of the Shiite jihad inside Syria might, if the world were different, have pleased Israel. These groups, who threatened Israel, no longer find favour in Damascus. The massive drug-trafficking empire by which Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy groups make their money can now be fought by the Syrian authorities, rather than aided and abetted by them, as it was under the former regime.

Al-Sharaa’s personal history, and a widespread Israeli view about the essential character of Syrian Sunnis, means that, for the moment at least, Israel is the declared and open enemy of the new Syria. It has invaded and occupied parts of Syria’s south, notably in the Quneitra Governorate, has destroyed the old Syrian navy and much of the former air force.

Al-Sharaa’s past is murky, although over time it is becoming better known. Born in Syria in 1984, he crossed the border into Iraq after 2003 to fight against the Americans. He joined al-Qaeda and rose inside the organisation, after stays in the terrorist ‘universities’, which American-run prisons soon became. When the Syrian civil war began in 2011, al-Sharaa saw his opportunity. In a much mythologised action, as a member of what was called the Islamic State of Iraq, he crossed into Syria with a few men, who became the core of his next organisation, the al-Nusra Front. Over the years, al-Nusra grew in capacity. It was distrusted by many Syrian rebels because of its jihadist history, and was repeatedly involved in inter-group fighting. Slowly, and after a few changes of name, it emerged as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with al-Sharaa, fighting as al-Jolani, its unquestioned leader.

Early in the Syrian war, al-Sharaa and HTS broke with al-Qaeda and what later became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). HTS fought and largely defeated the al-Qaeda franchise in Syria, Hurras al-Deen. Meanwhile, HTS and ISIS fought wherever they met. While ISIS embedded itself in Syria’s east and its deserts, HTS found itself confined to a regional pocket in the country’s north. As ISIS was destroyed by local forces aided by the worldwide Global Coalition, HTS was left to govern Idlib, the only province it controlled, along with parts of Aleppo and Hama Governorates. As ISIS was defeated and eclipsed, the Assad regime attempted to destroy HTS and liquidate Idlib, but its offensive was halted in 2019. The conflict remained nominally frozen while the Assad regime hollowed itself out, its edifice falling in after the beginning of a rebel offensive in November 2024.

The view of Israel is that al-Sharaa is the same jihadist he always was. His claim to be a Syrian nationalist interested only in domestic politics is viewed as a lie. Israeli sources also maintain that Syria’s Sunni minority in their hearts want war against Israel, though there is not much evidence for this. Al-Sharaa has only been interim president for a handful of months, but if it is believed enough to set policy, evidence becomes unnecessary. Israel’s invasion and occupation of a part of Syria is a serious threat to Damascus. It might make the new authorities — who have repeatedly said they have no interest in fighting Israel — increasingly unpopular. Israeli efforts to cultivate both the Druze minority and the Kurds who live in Syria’s north-east have not yet borne fruit.

Some Druze reject Israeli protection, and the largest Kurdish faction, the Syrian Democratic Forces, signed a major agreement with Damascus earlier this year.

But if Israel wishes to undermine the new Syria, it will not stop at this alone. It will use other levers, other agents, other tactics.

Iran is also determined to undermine the new Syrian government. Its agents have already tried to begin a new civil war with an uprising in Latakia — on Syria’s west coast — in March, and there was terrible violence as a result. Former military units and paramilitary groups loyal to the old regime conducted ambushes against forces loyal to the new government, and Damascus was concerned enough that a new civil war might ignite to order a general mobilisation. This was a disastrous mistake. Many militia members, or simply armed men without affiliation, travelled to Latakia, which has a large Alawite population (the minority from which the Assad family hails). It was violent chaos; gunmen kidnapped Alawites and executed them. Al-Sharaa and his justice ministry said that those who were responsible would be found and punished; but the damage was done.

Even as Iran is pounded by an Israeli air campaign, it still has plenty of assets to destabilise Syria. Its former allies in Assad’s armed forces and government have largely been pardoned and sent home under a general amnesty. They could take up arms again. The criminal networks associated with the old regime are still a potent tool, possibly usable by Iran in the future. If the clerical regime in Iran remains in power, its agents and allies will likely try to destabilise Syria with another civil war. They might succeed.

Separately, it is possible that, if al-Sharaa can keep civic peace in Syria, he has opportunities to improve his position. Both Iran and Israel want him overthrown, but they are fighting. As al-Sharaa’s enemies use their strength against each other, and if he can prove to Israel that he has as little interest in war as Israeli leaders believe Assad did, al-Sharaa might be able to prevent further Israeli invasion and occupation of Syria. He might be able to lessen Israel’s attempts to recruit Syria’s minorities into agents and possibly to drive an insurgency.

It is al-Sharaa’s challenge to prove that Syria does not need to be invaded, kept weak and divided, which is the Israeli plan. It is possible, however, indeed it is likely, that Israel’s leaders refuse to change their minds or their policy. Al-Sharaa may yet be next, after the leaders of Iran, to face a dramatic military escalation from Israel.