This year, Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister of Hungary, celebrated the 15th anniversary of his tenure in power. In April 2010, his party, Fidesz, secured a decisive two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections. Following the victory, Orbán claimed that his parliamentary mandate was the greatest since Charles de Gaulle’s triumph in France, which led to the establishment of the French Fifth Republic in 1958. In the earlier years of his rule, political analysts and journalists drew comparisons between Orbán’s political style and that of de Gaulle, who led France from 1958 to 1969. Such comparisons were particularly common after Orbán stated in 2014 that ‘we [Hungarians] are the continent’s Gaullists’. But does his rhetoric and strategy really reflect a newer version of Gaullist ‘Realpolitik’?

‘France cannot be France without greatness’, is a phrase attributed to de Gaulle. Conscious of France’s historical role as a European and global great power, his belief in French greatness was central to his politics. He aimed to restore his country’s position, prestige, and influence on the international political stage after a series of wartime and colonial losses. He envisioned an independent position for his state in an increasingly bipolar world. In 1966, he withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command and established the Force de dissuasion, later known as Force de Frappe, the country’s own nuclear arsenal, to ensure its defence without reliance on either the US or the Soviet Union. He strove to achieve strategic autonomy from the two superpowers of his era, while balancing German influence in Europe.

De Gaulle supported the idea of an Europe des nations, rather than advocating for federal integration and a supranational Europe. Twice he vetoed the United Kingdom’s entry into the European Economic Community because, he argued, their membership would increase American influence. In his pursuit of a balanced and multipolar world, de Gaulle sought a diplomatic détente with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, officially recognising the latter in 1964.

The French president, however, remained fundamentally anti-communist and pro-Western in defence matters. La Francophonie became a platform for promoting the French language and culture as an important form of soft power. De Gaulle considered his country’s leading role essential for preserving European civilisation and economic prosperity, as well as securing independence from external influence.

Orbán seems to have similar geopolitical goals. In March 2025, he outlined what the ‘Hungarian nation’ expects from Brussels, with the first point being the ‘Europe of nations’ and the third emphasising ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘a strong veto for national governments’. In July 2024, he introduced his new foreign policy paradigm, namely ‘Hungarian grand strategy’ or ‘connectivity’, explaining it as ‘good relations with the West and the East alike’.

Nonetheless, Orbán’s orientation has shifted significantly throughout his political career, especially in the past two decades. At the 19th anniversary event of Fidesz in 2007, he reminded the attendees that ‘We opened the door to the West and showed the East the door… Oil may come from the East, but freedom always comes from the West.’ At a conference in 2008, he explicitly condemned the Russian invasion of Georgia, stating:

It is the duty of Central European peoples, when an independent country is subjected to military aggression, to speak out clearly and unequivocally. I believe that we, Hungarians, are particularly burdened by this duty because of [19]56… Military aggression is, after all, military aggression.

Yet since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022, Orbán has carefully avoided holding Vladimir Putin accountable. Instead, he has discussed at length the responsibility of the EU, the US, NATO, and Volodymyr Zelensky.

On the question of sovereignty, Orbán’s ‘freedom fight’ is selective and distorted. Orbán has said of the Russian invasion of Ukraine – a country that shares a border with Hungary – that this was a ‘war between two Slavic brothers’, a confrontation largely triggered by NATO’s expansion and the ‘West’. In October 2024, during a fiery debate at the European Parliament with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, Orbán claimed that there was nothing in common between the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the ‘Ukrainian-Russian war’. In his interpretation, there is no accountability attached to the 2022 invader.

Hungary’s foreign affairs and trade can be contradictory. On the one hand, the Paks II project (extension of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant) was initiated in 2014 through an intergovernmental agreement between Hungary and the Russian Federation for the construction of two VVER-1200 reactors, to be provided by Rosatom. The contract is backed by a Russian state loan, financing most of the project. Concerns arose about Russian influence within the EU through Hungary’s growing energy reliance, the lack of transparency and confidentiality in the deal, environmental and safety risks, and the geopolitical implications for EU unity and NATO alignment.

On the other hand, despite his ongoing debates with the EU on rule-of-law issues and his persistent anti-Western propaganda, Orbán occasionally shepherds his followers back to Europe. In March 2025, encouraged by his ‘ally’, Donald Trump, and the new US administration, Orbán called for reform of the EU: ‘The remedy, my friends, is not to turn our backs on the European Union. On the contrary, we must not go outwards, but inwards: we shall occupy it and change it.’

Despite some common themes between Orbán and de Gaulle, there are significant distinctions that make the parallel difficult. The different economic, cultural, and geopolitical weights of France and Hungary necessitate divergent trajectories. De Gaulle did not align fully with either of the two ‘world orders’ of his time, and did not attack the ‘West’ while ignoring problems with the ‘East’. Orbán does not balance between superpowers. He critiques the ‘Empire of Brussels’, incites hostility towards Western Europe, and convinces his supporters that migrants and NGOs are the greatest threats to their safety. He frequently equates the USSR with the EU – he did so in March 2025:

As the nation is eternal, so too are empires unchanging: the empires of the crescent moon, the eagle, or the star – in red or Union yellow – have wanted only conquest and perpetual dominion. 

At the same time, he persistently fails to address the dangers posed by Putin, especially to the East-Central European region to which Hungary belongs. It is a different Russia and it is a different Europe, Orbán claims. While he envisions the Western ‘colonisation’ of Ukraine, he remains unbothered by Russia’s military invasion of a sovereign neighbour and, more strikingly, by the painful historical memories this invasion should evoke for Hungarians.

While Orbán’s rhetoric clearly echoes Gaullism, their geopolitical strategies place them on different historical trajectories. Charles de Gaulle’s ideas about France’s role in the world left a significant mark on his country’s institutions, foreign policy, and national identity, and his thinking on presidential power, national sovereignty, strategic independence, and cultural influence continue to shape how the people and leaders of France think of their nation today. Viktor Orbán’s legacy is yet to evolve. One thing is certain: a balance between global great powers will not be among the principles tied to his name.