On 22 January, 2026, the tension in transatlantic relations fell from fever pitch to a level of mere suspicious watchfulness. For several weeks, relations between, on the one hand, the United States of America and, on the other, the Kingdom of Denmark and most of its European allies had been escalated to the point of confrontation over Greenland. President Trump had been coveting the Arctic island for years but at the end of 2025 he went from blunt offers of purchase to veiled military threats. He now stressed that the US needed Greenland for world peace and not only, as he earlier claimed, for national security.

Emboldened by the spectacular tactical success in seizing President Nicholas Maduro of Venezuela, the White House seemed poised to make a dramatic move in the high north. Denmark and several allied countries deployed troops, formally as part of a pre-planned exercise but implicitly to defend Greenland – not against Chinese or Russian aggression, but rather against American forces. In response, the President declared that Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden would subject to punitive tariffs, initially of ten per cent but rising to 25 per cent by May, unless and until they acquiesced to his ambitions. In the end, however, the determined pushback from Denmark and other Europeans, increasingly loud signals from parts of the American political establishment that the Administration was approaching the unacceptable, and a critical public opinion in the US all combined to dissuade the President and avert further confrontation.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, it seemed that President Trump was looking for a way to de-escalate. One evening after he gave a speech mixing self-praise, derision and declarations of love for Greenland and Denmark, the Secretary-General of NATO, Mark Rutte, handed him one. The United States backed down, withdrew the tariff threat and shelved its Arctic ambitions, at least for now. An abrupt and irrevocable severing of the transatlantic link was avoided. Nonetheless, European confidence and trust in the United States have been seriously damaged. The history of NATO has sometimes been described as a sequence of crises, and the alliance has been declared moribund or outdated before. However, there are signs that this crisis was of a different order of magnitude.

In order to grasp the implications of the Greenland affair for the geopolitics of Europe and the Arctic, it is worth examining not only what this episode tells us about European unity but also, crucially, about the potential of European action on the world stage.

It was significant to see who was speaking and acting and who remained silent throughout the diplomatic crisis. The Head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, made a speech in Davos in which she voiced unequivocal support for Denmark and its sovereignty as well as for international law as it now stands. The European Parliament contributed to the pushback against Washington by suspending the ratification of the EU’s trade deal with the United States. Kaja Kallas, the High Representative of the EU in foreign and security policy, stated that the EU has ‘no interest to pick a fight, but we will hold our ground’. There was also talk, not so surreptitiously circulated to the media, about the EU loading up its ‘trade bazooka’ of retaliatory tariffs. So far, the central institutions of the European Union have signalled both in words and deeds that they were done with appeasing President Trump.

The reaction among the Member States of the Union was mixed. The northern European countries promptly dispatched troops – some with more bite than others – to Greenland. The composition of this ‘coalition of the willing’ demonstrated that neither European unanimity, nor a convoluted institutional process, is necessary for European countries to act. The participation of the United Kingdom further underscores this point. For decades the question of ‘European defence’, whether through NATO or the EU, has been plagued by political deadlock and endless discussions about what kind of intricate institutional design must be in place. When it really mattered, however, the countries that were most concerned and had the capabilities simply acted. Although we merely saw the ‘coalition of the willing’ format in an embryonic form, serious minds ought to start thinking whether this kind of action could be a way forward for defence collaboration.

Of course, a reasonable objection is that the deployment, aptly named ‘Arctic Endurance’, was a minuscule mission and larger ones require much more joint planning, not least regarding logistics, rotation of troops and long-term political support. This is undoubtedly so, but the concept of a select, and perhaps geographically distinct, group of countries acting on their own should be further explored. The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is an example of such a limited but dense collaboration among like-minded nations in Northern Europe. Recent developments in world politics, and not only the Greenland affair, certainly indicate that this concept is worth pursuing and developing further.

It is also noteworthy that hitherto very close partners of the United States are also starting to pursue hedging strategies and cultivate ties to other Great Powers. Canada recently signed a new strategic partnership with the EU and trade agreements with China. On 27 January, the EU and India signed a Free Trade Agreement that will give EU unique tariff reductions. A day later, on 28 January, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Keir Starmer, travelled to China for high level meetings with President Xi Jinping. Of course, such agreements and visits are long in the making, but it is noteworthy that they coincided with the most significant crisis in relations between European powers, China and the United States for many decades.

Finally, several European countries, like Spain and Portugal, chose to stay silent. While absolute consensus might be desirable in theory, it is hardly necessary in practice. Once again, this might be a model for the future. If an issue does not concern your government or country, then stand aside, but do not hinder the countries that do feel strongly about said issue. Reactions from Rome and Warsaw were more muted and they did not send any military personnel. The Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was fairly critical towards the American policy and his Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni offered some mild criticism of her European peers who ventured to Greenland. Once again, hearing many different European voices should perhaps not be seen as a sign of dysfunction but of a more flexible and resilient way of doing politics. European countries, their populations and their governments will have different opinions and priorities; expecting and requiring everyone to fall in line is not only misguided but also counterproductive. Perhaps, ultimately, pursuing a mode of cooperation akin to a concert of nations might be more fruitful than insisting on a federal solution.

The Nordic countries have all been strongly affected by the Greenland affair. Three factors are in play in this perfect Arctic storm: their unique strategic outlook, which is shaped by the proximity to and threat from Russia, as well as a past that is more violent than many outsiders recognise; their close mutual solidarity; and their very close political and cultural ties to the US.

Nordic security is fundamentally conditioned by Russia and has been so for centuries. This exposure means that they have to look for outside support, international law and cooperation among themselves for protection. President Trump’s actions over Greenland threaten the first two of these strategies, but strengthen the last one.

First of all, geography matters. Finland’s border with Russia is 1340 km long and its defences are firmly pointed towards the east. Norway’s Arctic County of Finnmark has a much shorter border with Russia. However, its northern coast is situated along the sea lanes that Russia’s northern fleet would use to enter the North Atlantic. Denmark is less exposed but it has been the subject of several recent drone incursions. Sweden has no direct border with Russia but has a long history of wars, hot and cold, with Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. The USSR was the reason for the construction of a considerable defence establishment until 1995. Solidarity with Ukraine is keenly felt across the political spectrum.

Throughout the tense standoff, Sweden’s Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, was highly vocal in his opposition to the line taken by the Trump Administration. Reactions to the Greenland affair have been strong across the political spectrum in Sweden. Intriguingly, several politicians and influential pundits have started to broach the issue of acquiring nuclear weapons. The actions of the Trump Administration have led thinkers of the left and right to question the stability of American deterrence and willingness to support its European allies. An answer to many then, would seem to be possessing a nuclear deterrent, either singly or jointly with other like-minded nations. Intriguingly, this idea was first raised by the left-liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter. To some extent, lingering reluctance to militarily align with the US on the left goes hand in hand with advocating for a very robust national defence. There is very little sign that such a radical step will become reality, but the mere fact that it is being publicly debated shows how much Washington’s actions are causing alarm even to friends and allies who are normally quite cautious in their diplomatic temperament.

There was no equivocation in Oslo either. While there has been no debate about developing Norwegian nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that the country has found itself in Washington’s crosshairs in recent weeks. During the height of last week’s tensions, President Trump sent a strongly worded communique to Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, in which he stated that he no longer found himself compelled to think ‘purely of peace’ due to Norway’s refusal to grant him the Nobel Peace Prize. It is always unclear when Trump is speaking from the heart and when he is using calculated tactics. What is certain, however, is that neither the form nor the content of such a missive corresponds to the amicable relations Norwegians have taken for granted with their American allies.

Finland’s President Alexander Stubb did not hesitate to contribute troops to Greenland. He has also been one of the most vocal, erudite and eloquent critics of the emerging trends in world politics. At the G20 meeting he recently stated that we are currently living in a moment of world historical significance. Finland and Sweden are two of the most closely aligned sovereign countries in the world, bound by centuries of history and a large exchange of populations across the Baltic. Under President Stubb, the country is also moving markedly closer to the other two Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Norway.

Taken together, the Nordic countries have a population of almost 28 million people and a GDP of roughly 2 trillion USD. They are not only motivated by solidarity with each other but also by their interest in upholding international institutions and international law. As comparatively small nations, they all certainly benefit from both. However, there is also a robust idealistic strain in all four countries that underpins their strong commitment to a rules-based order, an idealism that is unlikely to fade any time soon.

No country appreciates being menaced by larger ones. Three of the Nordic countries have painful histories that colour their strategic cultures. Denmark and Norway were occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War, and this experience has left a deep impression in the national psyche. In the Danish case, Nazi occupation during 1940-45 took place against the backdrop of having previously been defeated and dismembered by Prussia in the 19th century. The experience of being a small and very vulnerable country (‘et lille land’) but with a proud history and a rich cultural heritage runs like a main current in Danish identity. It also plays a part in explaining why reactions from Copenhagen to American overtures, threats and taunts have been so steely. Historical experiences, national pride and idealism fused in creating a solid backbone.

Danish soft power and cultural exports have emphasised generous welfare arrangements, gender equality, and even the concept of ‘hygge’. But Danish politics are usually characterised by an unusual sense of resolve, pragmatism and capacity for action. Whether it is instituting progressive policies on drugs or hard-nosed conservative ones like razing socially deprived housing estates with large migrant populations, Danes are capable of swift action. In that sense, Copenhagen’s diplomatic campaigns, its stalwart stance and its pre-emptive deployment of troops to Greenland rhyme well with long-established cultural themes.

For Denmark’s Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen of the Social Democratic Party, standing by Greenland and the Greenlanders also carries strong undertones of making amends. Danish colonialism of the island was not pretty and Copenhagen has worked very hard to put relations on a more equal footing. Abandoning the former subjects just when the wounds of history are healing would be adding insult to past injuries.

Other Nordic countries have unhappy memories of foreign occupation and domination. In the Norwegian case, there is the historical experience of being under Danish and then Swedish suzerainty between the mid-14th century and 1905. For Finns, their country’s wartime experiences have shaped a dogged determination to protect national sovereignty. The country was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939-40 (the Winter War) and fought further rounds of conflict between 1941 to 1944 (the Continuation War) and 1944-45 (the Lapland War) – at first on the side of the Axis against the Soviet Union, and then with the Allies against Nazi Germany. The result was that Finland maintained its sovereignty, albeit at a high cost. One of the most populous and prosperous regions, Karelia, was lost to the Soviet Union and half a million people had to be resettled. The sharp lesson was that freedom must be defended and, if national cohesion is strong enough, it can be defended successfully.

The Nordic countries are also connected to each other through culture, language and values. Regardless of institutional affiliations, they will always form a micro-community in Europe. Uniquely in Europe, neighbourly relations are not marred by anything worse than occasional squabbles and ice hockey rivalries. The last war between any two Nordic countries took place in 1814, a record practically unrivalled in any region on the continent. The sense of solidarity is profound, which means that a threat against any will be felt by all.

All of the Nordic countries also have strong ties to the United States. Although their governments have sometimes criticised US foreign policy, American culture has a considerable presence in Scandinavia, which is visible in fashion and television and audible in popular music from RnB to Heavy Metal. This means that the about-face in Washington, visible in the National Security Strategy of 2025, the National Defence Strategy of 2026 and the aggressive moves against Denmark come with painful feelings of betrayal. The significant stock of American diplomatic influence and cultural soft power in Europe’s high north, facilitated and strengthened by high levels of trust in Washington’s intentions, is now showing signs of withering.

Denmark and Norway were among the founding members of the North Atlantic Alliance and firmly welded their quest for security and desire to avoid occupation to close relations with America. Even though Finland and Sweden did not join NATO until 2023 and 2024, respectively, American culture permeated both countries. Across the political spectrum, American politics remain both of considerable interest and an undisputed point of reference for Swedish politicians.

The American pressure and threats over Greenland came as a particularly raw shock in Denmark. Despite having several opt-out clauses in its NATO membership, Copenhagen has been firmly committed to the Alliance and to America. Indeed, after the Cold War ended, Danish elites made a strategic resolution in this respect. Denmark is an exposed country that consists of open and largely flat terrain that is very favourable to an attacker. The only way to deter an aggressor alone would be to introduce an unacceptable degree of militarisation into Danish society. Instead, Copenhagen chose a transatlantic option: to ensure that their freedom would always be defended, they decided to establish their country as Washington’s best friend in Europe. This is why Denmark was one of the NATO countries that fought hardest at America’s side in Afghanistan. It was believed that Danish sacrifices in Helmand would guarantee that Copenhagen, Roskilde, Aarhus and the rest of the country would stay safe under an American-led security umbrella. For a country that went out of its way to purchase credibility, support and friendship in Washington by showing military solidarity and suffering significant battlefield casualties, the words and actions of the Trump Administration have dealt a very harsh blow indeed.

Russian reactions to the Greenland affair have been very informative. While the crisis was unfolding, Russian spokespersons and the press were cheering the US on. The official newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta hailed Trump’s moves, strongly urging him not to back down. The widely circulated daily Moskovsky Komsomolets gloated for all it was worth at the rupture in the alliance. Now, a week later, it hails a protracted conflict between Europe and the USA as part of an ‘optimal scenario’ for Moscow. The official Russian enthusiasm over a split between America and its European partners is obviously alarming, but it also reveals some interesting details about the military significance of Greenland. If there had been any substance to President Trump’s claims that the waters around Greenland were swarming with Chinese and Russian naval vessels, then obviously neither enhanced American nor NATO presence would be in Moscow’s interests. But these claims are and were baseless. In fact, Russia has no strategic interest in Greenland except as a foil to damage or even sever transatlantic relations.

Already in the 1980s, Soviet naval strategists realised that the US Navy was able to detect and thus hunt down their nuclear submarines, which are essential to the second-strike capability. Hence, they withdrew from the North Atlantic into the so-called ‘Bastion Defence’ system. This consists of carefully guarded Arctic bases, from which the nuclear-armed submarines do not venture far. There is nothing to suggest that the capabilities of the Northern Fleet have improved vis-à-vis their American rivals in a way that would even remotely change this calculus.

Furthermore, Russia’s strategists and politicians know full well that they could not make any move against Greenland without provoking a strong reaction from the US and NATO.  Their strategy is predicated on avoiding direct confrontations that they know will end in disaster and instead rely on subterfuge, political manipulation and biding their time. Certainly, Moscow would not be happy to see the US establishing a robust missile defence on Greenland, but that would be a separate and more distant matter for the Kremlin strategists. Enhanced American missile defence capabilities that Moscow perhaps never intends to test might be a small prize to pay for a paralysed or even destroyed NATO. Russia’s primary aims seem to be supremacy in Europe, not global competition with the United States.

The Russian pleasure in the crisis between the United States and its allies over Greenland underscores the tragedy of the whole affair. It was an unnecessary crisis whose repercussions are already felt in many more areas of transatlantic and European security. If the United States wanted bases for missile defence and early warning, they could simply have asked Copenhagen and they would gladly have granted access. As matters stand, Washington has further damaged its reputation and credibility – and all for gains that will prove to be as elusive and transient as the snows that pass in an Arctic blizzard.