Syrians could hardly contain their excitement. Rather than wait for the anniversary of Bashar al-Assad’s ousting on 8 December 2024, festivities erupted across the country from as early as 27 November, the date which marked the start of operation ‘Deterrence of Aggression’. With its success, more than half a century of dynastic rule came to an end and, with it, the region’s last Baathist redoubt.

In the months and years leading up to the fall of Assad, marching into Damascus as conquerors seemed an unlikely outcome for the Syrian opposition, which came to be led by the militant organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Syria’s conflict had not just solidified into a so-called ‘frozen’ phase, but also appeared to have fallen hostage to the fractured dynamics on which the Assad regime based its rule. The jihadist opposition led by HTS, dismissed as uncouth radicals, were confined to the northwest of the country. In the east were the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish paramilitary group that enjoys support from the West, but which is deeply distrusted by both the Arab populations, which lived in many of the areas they controlled, and Turkey, which worries about their aspirations for independence. Even the Druze had grown weary of Assad in recent years, but were largely confined to the south and could be kept preoccupied by benefitting from the smuggling routes of illicit drugs and weapons that passed through their territories. That trade was, of course, tightly controlled by some of Assad’s most important and trusted allies, troops from Iran and Hezbollah motivated by sectarianism and greed.

Assad allowed those competing dynamics of millenarianism, ethnic distrust, sectarianism, and criminality to become mortgaged to external actors in order to buttress his foundering regime. Foreign jihadist fighters kept the international community scared of HTS. Ethnic distrust of the Kurds meant Turkish intrigue would preoccupy the SDF. Meanwhile, Iranian and Hezbollah militias kept the Sunnis in government-held areas under control. They also pacified some Druze communities by co-opting them into smuggling networks. Keeping everyone divided and distracted in this way helped Assad turn the war in his favour.

For a moment, it appeared as if he had succeeded. Just over a decade after the uprising began, Assad was being backed by Gulf actors who reasoned that he had won. After a devastating earthquake struck Syria and Turkey in February 2022, killing more than 50,000 people, Assad was invited to the UAE to meet Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. It was his first trip to an Arab country since 2011. Almost exactly a year later, he was back in the UAE, this time greeted by a 21-gun salute. By the time he was received by the Arab League during their meeting in May 2023, his rehabilitation appeared complete.

The November 2024 offensive unravelled all that, propelling Ahmed al-Sharaa into power. One year later, however, he is realising just how much Syria’s fortunes continue to be held hostage by the interests of its international stakeholders – and how hard this aspect of Assad’s chaotic rule will prove to unpick.

Syria’s most significant international threats come from Iran, Russia and Israel. Surprisingly, Russia has revealed itself to be the most pragmatic of the three. Distracted by events in Ukraine, al-Sharaa recognised that Russia’s interests in Syria were only ever transactional and that Moscow could effectively be bought off. During an interview with Syrian state TV, al-Sharaa explained that his fighters had opened lines of communication with Russian forces prior to their lightning offensive in November and December 2024. This meant that, as the frontlines reached Homs and Hama, the Russians retreated to their bases with the understanding that they would be left alone. ‘We made certain commitments’, he said, ‘and we have fulfilled them.’ This was a reference to promises he made not to attack Russian forces in the country at the time, and to honour their existing agreements – thereby assuaging Putin’s fears about losing Russia’s access to the Mediterranean. Going forward, this approach has served as the basis for ongoing co-operation between the new government and Moscow, neutering Russia as a potential spoiler.

Putin’s allies in Tehran, however, have not enjoyed the same offer. Although Iran has the most pressing reasons for wanting to destabilise the current administration, it has been overrun by the fallout from the 7 October attacks in Israel. Most notably, its primary regional proxy – and the group on which it was most reliant in Syria – Hezbollah, was eviscerated by Israel in just ten extraordinary days during September 2024.

First it launched the exploding pager attack on 17 September, which killed 12 people and wounded a further 2,800. The next day, another series of explosions took place, this time walkie-talkies linked to Hezbollah. Twenty were killed and 450 injured. Not only were these audacious attacks humiliating for the group, they also revealed the extent to which Hezbollah had been penetrated by Israeli intelligence. Two days later, Ibrahim Aqil, the group’s de facto military commander and leader of its elite special operations unit known as the Radwan Force, was killed in an airstrike. Six days after that, Israel revealed it also knew the location of the movement’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, by assassinating him while he convened a meeting in Hezbollah’s subterranean offices in the Dahieh district of southern Beirut. These were some of the most consequential days in the group’s four-decade history, unravelling its stranglehold over the Lebanese state and, by extension, Tehran’s sphere of influence, too.

It was against that backdrop that Assad’s regime also collapsed, coming just over two months later. Tehran and Hezbollah were both neutered and unable to respond. ‘There’s no doubt that the political transformation which took place in Syria was a major strategic loss, we can’t deny that,’ said Ali Fayyad, a Hezbollah parliamentarian and founding member of the organisation, during an interview with the Lebanese journalist Ali Rizk. ‘Regarding the new leadership in Syria, we are not looking for trouble.’ Fayyad’s bald tone reveals the extent to which Iran’s hand was weakened by events in Damascus. Assad’s removal signalled the end of Tehran’s ability to supply Hezbollah with men, money, and munitions through land and air bridges that run through Syria.

That is a connection Iran has enjoyed since the very moment the Islamic Republic came into existence. Even before Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, Hafez al-Assad had tied the fortunes of the heterodox Alawite sect, to which he belongs, with those of Shia Muslims. Syria’s constitution stipulates that the country’s ruler has to be Muslim, something which undermined the legitimacy of Hafez’s claims to the presidency. His fortunes changed after a prominent Lebanese-Iranian scholar, Musa al-Sadr, was persuaded to issue a fatwa officially declaring the Alawite community a branch of Shia Twelverism (the predominant Shia sect) in 1973. From Hafez al-Assad’s perspective, tethering his regime’s fate to the regional ascendency of Shia political Islam was so politically expedient, that Syria was the first Arab state to officially recognise the Islamic Republic after Khomeini took power in 1979.

The downfall of the Assad dynasty therefore represents more than just a strategic loss for Iran. It is ideological, too. This combination of factors has heavily affected Iran, making the Ayatollahs weaker today than at any point since 1979. Again, al-Sharaa has seized the moment to secure his interests. Not only has Iran not been offered a transactional exchange in the way Russia was, but Syrian forces are aggressively working against Iran’s proxies. That much was confirmed in a recent statement by CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper, who declared:

Congratulations to Syria’s security forces for recently interdicting multiple weapons shipments. These shipments were intended for Lebanese [sic] Hizbollah. The United States and our regional partners have a shared interest in ensuring the disarmament of Lebanese [sic] Hizbollah and in preserving peace and stability across the Middle East.

Ironically, it is Iran’s greatest adversary, Israel, that is now at risk of inflicting greatest harm on Syria. Within hours of Assad’s downfall, Israel launched Operation Arrow of Bashan – referencing a biblical territory located in modern Syria – comprising a blistering assault on Syrian territory from land, sea, and air. Within hours, almost all of Syria’s naval fleet was destroyed, with Israel’s Defence Minister, Israel Katz, declaring the operation ‘a great success’. Around 1,000 airstrikes have followed, targeting military bases, chemical weapons depots and associated scientific research centres. At the same time, Israel also seized the entirety of Mount Hermon (Syria’s highest peak) and moved well beyond the UNDOF Buffer Zone (sometimes known as the ‘Purple Line’), which had served as the de facto Syrian-Israeli border since 1967. Everything points to this being a protracted occupation, complete with the creation of two new military installations filled with intelligence gathering equipment, communications infrastructure and a 20,000-litre water facility.

In total, Israel has seized control of 400-square kilometres of Syrian territory and, at its most extended point, operates just 40 kilometres from Damascus. These incursions have taken a huge toll. According to aggregate figures from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, around 73 people have been killed as a direct result of Israeli military actions, including children. Scores of people have also been abducted and subjected to military detention. This new reality reveals the extent to which Israel has sought to create an expansive security umbrella over the entirety of southern Syria, demanding that its three most southernly governates – Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda – are all demilitarised, effectively creating a buffer zone everywhere south of Damascus.

This intent and capacity to act are what set Israel apart from Russia and Iran. While the latter have either lost or abandoned their primary proxies, Israel remains very much in control of its own local stakeholders: the Druze. Trouble with them began in April after a video circulated showing an alleged Druze militiaman committing blasphemy. Armed groups consisting of both government-aligned forces and Bedouin tribes swarmed into Druze areas and, in the city of Jaramana, opened fire on a local checkpoint. Clashes quickly spiralled to neighbouring towns, prompting a series of kidnappings, revenge attacks and extrajudicial killings. Although the government was eventually able to restore order, Israel also demonstrated its willingness to defend the Druze by bombing several sites across Syria.

An uneasy truce was eventually established until 11 July, when a Druze merchant was robbed by Bedouins on the Damascus-Suwayda highway, igniting a tinderbox of violent recriminations. Events spiralled again quickly, leading to a messy period of internecine conflict between both sides. Government forces were not entirely blameless either. For example, some videos showed members of the General Security Service making highly sectarian slogans and engaging in the abuse of prisoners. For its part, Damascus insisted these were local actors who had gone rogue and sent forces from the capital to restore order. They apprehended the offending members of the General Security Service and sent troops directly into Suwayda.

That was a move too far for Hikmat al-Hijri, a revered and hugely influential spiritual figure among the Suwayda Druze. He decided this was his moment to act and called on both the United States and Israel to intervene in defence of the Druze, whom he said were facing a genocide. Hijri was already known to be hostile towards the al-Sharaa administration and had welcomed Israel’s airstrikes in May. Now, he upped the ante by casting the situation in Suwayda as an existential one. Israel responded immediately and decisively. Within 48 hours, the IDF launched a series of brazen and audacious attacks in central Damascus, bombing the Ministry of Defence before striking areas around the presidential palace. The unspoken corollary was clear: Israel could reach al-Sharaa if it wanted and would absolutely honour its commitment of protecting the Druze.

In addition to outrage in Damascus, the attacks also drew direct criticism from the United States. ‘The current government of Syria, in my opinion, has conducted themselves as best they can as a nascent government with very few resources to address the multiplicity of issues that arise in trying to bring a diverse society together’, said Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria.

Netanyahu’s strategy has been hard to understand. Yes, Israel’s appetite for risk is, understandably, greatly diminished since 7 October 2023. It therefore sees its security as being predicated upon an even more muscular and aggressive regional posturing. Yet, even from that perspective, a unified and stable Syria is in Israel’s interests. Netanyahu appears not to agree, favouring a strategy that would destabilise Damascus, keep the country divided, and see power devolved into its respective provinces.

That approach has placed it at odds with the Trump administration, which worries that Israeli policy might lead to an Iranian or Hezbollah revival in region. It has therefore backed al-Sharaa enthusiastically and paved the way for Syria’s reintegration into the international arena. During his visit to Riyadh in May, Trump stunned everyone, not just by announcing the suspension of sanctions via Syria General License 25, but also by meeting directly with al-Sharaa himself.  ‘If we engage them, it may work out’, said Marco Rubio, explaining the president’s decision. ‘If we did not engage them it was guaranteed to not work out.’

Sanctions relief has given both the international community and the business world the confidence to re-engage with Syria. The European Commission, for example, announced that it is committing €2.5 billion towards helping the country’s socio-economic recovery. That comes alongside more targeted, sectoral support for specific initiatives focused on transitional justice, accountability and human rights.

Gulf states have also pivoted towards large-scale capital investments, with al-Sharaa using the Future Investment Initiative in Riyadh to secure $28 billion in investments, mostly from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. This came a few months after the Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum, where the Saudi Minister of Investment, Khalid Al-Falih, visited Damascus to agree $6.4 billion in deals covering a range of sectors, including infrastructure, telecommunications, information technology, industry, tourism and health.

There is a clear shift in the type of money now flowing into Syria; where previously it was mostly focused on aid, there is now a greater emphasis on investment. That shift in approach is brought into sharp relief by the fact that more official delegations have now visited Syria since Assad’s demise than during the entirety of the Baathist period. That international confidence is critical to stabilising Syria, reviving its economy, and ensuring malevolent actors cannot reassert themselves.

With new deals freshly inked – something President Trump values highly – Ahmed al-Sharaa visited the White House last month, marking his third direct meeting with the president in just six months. It was a deft move, in which he demonstrated his willingness to accommodate the political realities with which he finds himself grappling. ISIS, Hezbollah and Iran do not just pose a threat to his state-building ambitions in Syria, but are also entrenched enemies of the United States. He therefore took the opportunity to declare that Syria would be joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

It is precisely the kind of approach the Trump administration favours in the Middle East, where local leaders are given broad licence to act independently when their interests align with Washington’s. ‘We want to see Syria become a country that’s very successful’, he said. ‘And I think this leader can do it. I really do.’ Following the ceremony to mark the reopening of Syria’s embassy in Washington DC, Secretary Rubio restated the administration’s position:

We want to give these guys every chance to succeed. They’ve told us what they want to do is create a national Syrian government in which every element of Syrian society is represented and feels safe. They don’t want Syria to ever again be a base of operations for Iran, for ISIS, or for any of these groups. They want it to be a country, not a launching pad for attacks against their [sic.] neighbors.

And so we want to give them every chance to succeed in that regard. The alternative is that if it doesn’t work, if this doesn’t happen and it collapses, then the alternative is going to be that Syria will fall into civil war, and it will become a playground for virtually every dangerous element in the Middle East, and including a return of Iran, and it’ll even strengthen Hizballah. So we don’t want to see that happen, so this is the best option on the table to prevent that from happening.

Challenges from Israel continue to pose a threat to those aspirations. An IDF incursion into the village of Beit Jinn just under two weeks ago resulted in the deadliest exchange yet between Israeli forces and armed Syrian factions. In the event, six Israeli soldiers were wounded and 13 Syrians killed. The incident provoked outrage in Damascus, which accused Israel of launching a ‘criminal attack’. Trump finally intervened directly by phoning Netanyahu and then writing on Truth Social:

It is very important that Israel maintain a strong and true dialogue with Syria, and that nothing takes place that will interfere with Syria’s evolution into a prosperous State.

He added that he had been ‘very satisfied’ with the progress Syria has made so far. Speaking at the Doha Forum this weekend, al-Sharaa confirmed that back-channel negotiations have been taking place with Israel and that ‘influential’ countries are involved, including the United States.

The day after Trump’s call, Netanyahu offered his most conciliatory tone yet about the new Syrian government. ‘With good will and understanding, an agreement can be reached with the Syrians’, he said. ‘But we will stand by our principles in any case.’

To do that, he will have to overcome the traumas of October 7, just as al-Sharaa appears to have overcome the traumas of Syria’s bitter fourteen-year conflict. In this regard, Syria has sent ‘positive messages to Israel regarding regional peace and stability’, he told attendees at the Doha Forum. He can point to more than just his words.

Despite more than 1,000 airstrikes and 400 incursions, no element of the Syrian government has responded to Israel militarily. Indeed, a few weeks after the airstrikes around the presidential palace, al-Sharaa travelled to Idlib – where the majority of his jihadist constituency remains – to explain the next stage of Syria’s war. ‘We still have another battle ahead of us to unify Syria’, he said. ‘It should not be with blood and military force… it should be through some kind of understanding, because Syria is tired of war.’