Sweden’s Cold War tightrope

Since the Russian full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022 it has been claimed by politicians, journalists and experts that we – in the Baltic Sea Region – are in the worst security situation since the Second World War. It can also be claimed, however, that we – in the Baltic Sea Region – are in the best security situation since the end of the Second World War. Russia has almost all of its ground forces in Ukraine, which means that it cannot use them elsewhere. All states around the Baltic Sea are members of the EU and NATO (except Russia), all states around the Baltic Sea are liberal democracies, supporting individual freedom and the rule of law (except Russia), and all states are prospering market economies based on free trade and common economic markets (except Russia).

During the Cold War, many of the states around the Baltic Sea were de facto part of the Soviet empire: East Germany, Poland, the Baltic states, plus many others further south in central and eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. They were forced by the Soviet Union to be totalitarian communist states with planned economies, restricted individual freedom and limited rule of law. Furthermore, they were forced into different kinds of military pacts with the Soviet Union (including Finland). The other states around the Baltic Sea were either ‘neutral’ (Sweden), or members of the EU and NATO with restrictions (Denmark, West Germany). During its peak in the 1970s the Soviet economy reached approximately 50 per cent of US GDP. Now Russia has a GDP comparable to that of Italy.

During the Cold War, Western military intelligence estimated that the Soviet Union and its allies had vast armies that could overthrow and occupy Western Europe – including the Nordic countries – within a month. As Peter Haldén puts it, ‘The Second World War dramatically changed the geopolitical situation in the Baltic Sea region. For the first time in history a single power exercised uncontested control over the entire littoral from the Neva to the Elbe.’ Wilhelm Carlgren has, earlier, put it in a similar way: the war ended with effective Soviet control over the eastern and southern coast of the Baltic Sea, from Torneå to Lübeck, ‘a power situation that Tsarist Russia never achieved. Sweden’s east and south coast was now the frontier towards the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union.’

Today it is a fact that Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which is worrying, but generally it is not close to the political, economic and military power that the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. Russia has no political appeal in the West (which it had back then), it has no allies except Belarus (which it had back then), its economy is more than ten times smaller than Europe’s, and it does not have an army of millions that can attack and occupy Europe within a month. In this essay I will – in more detail – describe and analyse the geostrategic situation in the Baltic Sea during the Cold War, and how Sweden manoeuvred politically, economically and militarily in that environment.

Shortly after the Second World War it became clear that the winning powers, the Soviet Union, the UK and the US, could not co-operate. A ‘cold war’ broke out during the second part of the 1940s and on 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington DC. After the North Korean attack on South Korea in the summer of 1950, the Western allies feared that an attack on Western Europe was imminent and therefore created a permanent civil and military organisation, NATO – built on the North Atlantic Treaty – to be prepared to handle the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. The first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was General Dwight D Eisenhower, who had led the liberation of Western Europe and forced Nazi Germany to surrender in 1945.

During that time continental Europe was extremely weak – politically, economically and militarily – after six years of war. Therefore, NATO’s main mission became developing regional commands that could plan for the defence of Western Europe, and to stimulate its members to build up their defence forces. NATO’s European Command under Eisenhower was divided into four geographical areas: the North Command with its headquarters in Oslo, the Central Command with its headquarters in Fontainebleau, the South Command with its headquarters in Naples, and the Mediterranean Command with its headquarters in Malta.

The northern and southern flanks were not prioritised, compared to the central western European front. As it was expressed in a strategic document from 1952:

Though the defence of Western Europe would be greatly assisted by successful defence of Scandinavia and Southern Europe, the loss of either of these latter would not make the task impossible. On the other hand, should Western Europe be over-run, the defence of Scandinavia and Southern Europe would be seriously jeopardised and the threat to the British Isles would be very greatly increased.

The major value of the northern flank during the early days of the Cold War was that the shortest air routes for the superpowers to bomb each other went through the area, a fact that became less and less important as air fuelling was made possible and when intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles were developed. The other benefit was that the Soviet Union built up the Northern Fleet in the Murmansk area to ensure its ability to strike against the support that was expected to arrive from across the Atlantic in case of war, and to be able to hit the continental US with sea-based nuclear missiles. Around 1960 the Northern Fleet became the largest of the four fleets of the Soviet Union, and as a result, during the so-called Second Cold War in the beginning of the 1980s the northern flank was generally viewed as a front rather than a flank.

The two most important strategic focal points in Scandinavia during the Cold War were therefore northern Norway and the Baltic Straits. Northern Norway because the Soviet Union needed access to the Atlantic Ocean to threaten US support to Europe and to protect its nuclear second-strike capability in the Murmansk region. The Baltic Straits because the Soviet Union did not want the West to have access to the Baltic Sea, and because they themselves wanted to be able to get out of the Baltic Sea if required. They wanted to control those two focal points. From a Western point of view, it was the other way around. NATO wanted to deny the Soviet Union, and its allies, access to northern Norway and the Baltic Straits. At the beginning of the Cold War that was the level of ambition: to deny rather than control.

The Western ambition towards control over these areas grew throughout the Cold War, but the Soviet Union and its allies were conventionally much stronger than the West during the entire Cold War. In addition, during the second half of the Cold War the Soviet Union possessed a nuclear capability comparable to that of the West. Hence the reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the conventional military strength of the Soviet Union and its allies during the first part of the Cold War (‘massive retaliation’) was gradually replaced by a strategy of ‘flexible response’. In principle, that meant the West would not automatically use nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union attacked, but rather respond with means that were suitable for the situation. For example, allied conventional forces could reinforce national forces on the flanks, or weapons, ammunition and other equipment could be pre-positioned in Norway, etc.

Since Sweden has a border with both northern Norway and the Baltic Straits, there was a high risk that Swedish territory would be invaded in a war between the superpowers. It was, in fact, difficult to see how a new war between the two could unfold without drawing in Sweden. Swedish territory was not important per se, but the fact that it bordered on the two strategic focal points in the region made it indirectly interesting for both superpowers. How did the Swedish political and military leadership handle this?

Sweden was one of the few European countries that had not been dragged into the Second World War, which meant that it had a huge industrial capability (including its defence industry). For a short period in the late 1940s and 1950s it had one of Europe’s largest armed forces. Sweden’s air force was the fourth largest in the world after the Soviet Union, the UK and the US. Sweden had largely dismantled its defence forces after the First World War, but succeeded in building them up again during the Second World War. The downsizing of the Swedish armed forces that was then expected after 1945 was hindered by the outbreak of the Cold War and Sweden’s choice to adopt a policy of neutrality.

When the Swedish government realised that a new ‘cold’ war had broken out in 1948 it tried to hinder Denmark and Norway from joining the North Atlantic Treaty. The reason was, as mentioned above, that a new world war would probably affect Nordic territory (northern Norway and the Baltic Straits), which meant that Sweden would be likely to be affected and/or dragged in. According to the government, if Denmark and Norway joined the Atlantic Pact the probability increased that a war would affect Scandinavia, including Sweden. Therefore, the government wanted to create a ‘neutral’ defence union to make Scandinavian territory less interesting for the superpowers and easier to defend with the support of Denmark and Norway.

Accordingly, when Denmark and Norway joined the North Atlantic Treaty instead of creating a Scandinavian defence union with Sweden, the Swedish government stated that this would guarantee being dragged into a new world war. Conversely, staying out of the pact and adopting a policy of neutrality would at least not automatically involve Sweden in the war. The Swedish experience of the Second World War was also different from Denmark’s and Norway’s. They had also applied a neutrality policy when the war broke out but were attacked by Nazi Germany anyway.

Although Sweden did not join the North Atlantic Treaty, it saw itself as a part of the Western political, economic and military structures. Politically, it was a liberal democracy, economically it was well integrated into Western trade, and militarily it was ‘neutral’ on the Western side. During the Second World War the Swedish political and military leadership had agreed that Sweden must end up on the ‘right’ side in a war (if it was dragged in), which meant on the side of the democracies. After the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed, Sweden started to co-operate secretly with the nearest NATO allies – Norway and Denmark – and the most important allies – the UK and the US. This involved mainly the air force and intelligence, but also army and naval co-operation, especially regarding the defence of the Baltic Straits and the North Calotte.

Although Sweden did not co-operate directly with NATO, it was very well informed by its Danish and Norwegian friends about what was happening in the organisation, how NATO viewed the defence of the northern flank, and how Sweden could act in accordance with that. As mentioned, Sweden was the only country in Scandinavia that had a robust defence, and Denmark’s and Norway’s allies did not prioritise the northern flank compared to the central front. Therefore, a defence of Scandinavia, from a Western perspective, could not be efficient without Sweden either standing in the way of the Soviet Union and its allies’ attempt to control northern Norway and the Baltic Straits, or Sweden giving up its ‘neutrality’ and joining the allies. In an estimate from 1950, the allies viewed Sweden’s importance as ‘considerable’ because of its economic, industrial and military strength, and because the full co-operation of Sweden ‘would greatly enhance the defensive strength of the Northern European Region’. The Soviet Union could not disregard that possibility of ‘Sweden joining the Northern Allies when Norway is attacked’.

Politically, Sweden was trying to watch the restrictive Danish and Norwegian alliance policy, which in short meant no permanent allied bases or nuclear weapons on Danish and Norwegian territory as long as the countries were not under immediate threat of war, or at war. In addition, there were restrictions against an allied presence in northeastern Norway and on the Danish island of Bornholm during peacetime. As soon as the Swedish government perceived a change in that policy it reacted through diplomatic channels (there was no public criticism). Sweden had an interest in maintaining the Nordic region as an area of low tensions or as a buffer zone between the two superpowers.

This view can of course be debated, but the fact is that not only the Swedish government, but also the Danish and Norwegian, acted in the spirit of a ‘Nordic balance’ to benefit the security of the northern flank. If Denmark or Norway were to give up their restrictive alliance policy or if Sweden were to join NATO, then the Soviet Union would respond by tightening its grip on Finland. The security situation in the region would then worsen and become similar to the central front. Or conversely, if the Soviet Union tightened its grip over Finland, Sweden could respond by becoming a member of NATO, and Denmark and Norway by abolishing their bases and nuclear policy, which also would increase the tensions between the superpowers in the area.

Lastly, Sweden did not join the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunner of the European Union (EU), during the Cold War because it was seen as incompatible with the neutrality policy, and as ‘NATO’s economic leg’. The EEC had supranational power, which was seen as hindering Swedish political and economic freedom of action. That did not mean, however, that Sweden was not integrated into the Western economic trade system. Together with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, Sweden created the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960, which was not supranational and thus regarded as compatible with the policy of neutrality.

To conclude, the geostrategic situation in the Baltic Sea region during the Cold War was that the Soviet Union and its allies dominated the region almost totally. They had conventional military forces that could invade and occupy Western Europe, including the Nordic countries, within a month. The Western allies could hope to obstruct and prevent the Soviet Union and its allies controlling northern Norway and the Baltic Straits in war, but during the first part of the Cold War they did not have the military resources to achieve this, at least not without Swedish support. The allies were relying heavily on nuclear retaliation, should the Soviets attack Western Europe and Scandinavia.

In this geostrategic environment, Sweden acted cautiously. It fell back on its traditional neutrality policy when the Cold War broke out in the late 1940s, after trying to prevent Denmark and Norway from joining the North Atlantic Treaty. The government watched the restrictive alliance policy of Denmark and Norway carefully. As soon as Sweden perceived a change it was made clear that this was not in the interests of Sweden, nor Denmark, Finland or Norway, since it could increase tensions and thus decrease security in the area.

Militarily, Sweden was one of the strongest powers in Europe during the Cold War. When the Cold War ended Sweden had 29 army brigades, compared to today’s 1.5. (According to current plans the number of army brigades will increase to four by 2030.) Its air force was one of the largest in Europe, and almost all men were doing their military service every year. That corresponded to 50,000 service personnel compared to today’s total of 8,000 men and women. Since Sweden viewed itself as part of the West, and the West viewed Sweden as part of the West, the country was deemed to be a Western asset in a potential war between the Western and Eastern blocs. It also resulted in a relatively comprehensive secret co-operation, mainly carried out between Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the UK and the US.

Economically, Sweden was also an asset for the West, although it did not join the EU until 1995. It was well integrated in the world economy, not least through EFTA.

Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has openly co-operated militarily with NATO (since 1994), joined the EU (1995), abandoned the neutrality policy (2009), made some 20 bilateral, trilateral and minilateral defence agreements with almost every NATO member, and eventually became a member of NATO in 2024. One of the most important reasons for that gradual change is that the geostrategic situation in the Baltic Sea Region has changed fundamentally since the Cold War. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Russia is economically very weak. All the states around the Baltic Sea, except Russia, are members of the EU and NATO. Compared to the Cold War, this is not a bad security situation.

This essay was originally published in The Baltic Sea: A Geopolitical History, edited by Peter Haldén and published by Bokförlaget Stolpe.