Has Iran won the war by not losing?

Even during the Pakistan-led mediation efforts to finalise a draft deal between Tehran and Washington, US President Donald Trump used a 23 May press conference to effectively declare victory, yet again boasting of having ‘decapitated’ Iran’s leadership. The declaration, however, may ring hollow (and premature) without consensus on the ultimate metric of success. After all, is the true measure of victory what was destroyed, or what survived?

For Tehran, its ability since 28 February to defy predictions of immediate regime collapse under the US-Israel bombardment has validated its decades-long contentions. The Islamic Republic’s strategy can be summarised as: ‘Hit me with your best shot, I can take it and give as good as I get – and give you both a bloody nose.’ That sentiment was captured in a post on X by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei, who invoked an episode from Sasanian history during which Rome was forced to make peace on Persian terms, a not-so-subtle suggestion that Iran, too, believes it has emerged victorious from the confrontation without capitulating. For a state often portrayed by Middle East analysts as a methodical chess player, the conflict has offered Iran another opportunity to showcase the value of endurance and positional advantage over rapid tactical gains. More significantly, it has also signalled a paradigmatic transformation in the nature of modern warfare.

Iran’s first victory was surviving and demonstrating it could wage economic warfare by manipulating the price of hydrocarbons. Its second victory was to bring home to its Gulf neighbours the price of hosting American military bases. The third victory was to show it could hit Israel on numerous occasions, even at times overwhelming its missile defences. Its fourth victory was keeping a powerful ‘wild card’ in reserve, with the Yemeni Houthis retaining the capacity to disrupt Red Sea shipping. Its fifth victory was keeping major pieces on the regional chessboard as viable force multipliers. Its Iraqi militia allies proved capable of striking targets as far afield as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including a nuclear facility. Its proxy, Hezbollah, not only struck Israel in retaliation for the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, but has also remained a potent force despite Israel’s occupation of the south of Lebanon.

On that basis, Iran can plausibly make the case that it has won the war simply by not losing. It has withstood the pressure and held its ground. After all, a costly and drawn-out campaign that fails to deliver the stated aims of regime change or capitulation looks less like victory for the aggressors – perhaps more like a Pyrrhic one.

Over time, Iran has demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetrical techno-guerilla warfare in confronting technologically superior adversaries. By leveraging proxy networks, regional influence and deterrence strategies, it has outmanoeuvred a global superpower and a regional hegemon.

The conflict has lent credence to the well-worn chess analogy, in which the Islamic Republic’s partners in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and beyond function as pieces in a longer game designed to befuddle its opponent’s calculations. The comparison has also been drawn upon by US President Donald Trump, who has portrayed his own strategy as a form of ‘4D chess’. Albeit, critics have argued that his approach to foreign policy more closely resembles poker – transactional, improvisational and geared toward short-term advantage.

Even the most diehard critics of the Islamic Republic are now conceding that the conflict has rewarded the Grandmaster. Through patience, and the creative use of limited resources over overwhelming military superiority, Iran has redefined modern combat as a contest of endurance and strategic patience, potentially rendering obsolete the traditional metrics of victory, such as territorial gain, decisive defeat or rapid capitulation. This evolution is visible in Iran’s own capabilities as well as among its regional allies. Hezbollah, for example, has deployed fibre-optic-guided first-person-view (FPV) attack drones, which have reportedly been able to circumvent sophisticated multibillion-dollar Israeli defences.

Victory will be hard to define in conventional terms but there are precedents. In 1956, when Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser lost a war against Britain, France and Israel, he claimed victory because he stood up to ‘the West’. When Saddam Hussein was soundly defeated by Coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi leader claimed victory because he stood up to the West and survived, while his nemesis, George H. Bush, did not even get re-elected for a second term. The current Supreme Leader of Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei, may remain in power, whereas Netanyahu might lose elections and Trump’s mandate could take a severe hit in the upcoming November midterm elections.

If there is now a growing perception that the United States is seeking an ‘off-ramp’, it suggests a recognition that the costs of prolonged confrontation outweigh any anticipated benefits. Recent polls showing that a majority of Americans now oppose the Iran war have further narrowed Washington’s room for manoeuvre with Tehran.

While neither side can easily claim a definitive strategic victory under these conditions, there is a measure of asymmetry in how success is defined. Iran claims endurance through survival under sustained pressure, while Trump is reined in by the need to avoid escalation beyond politically acceptable limits ahead of a midterm election.

Having weathered the initial shock of the attacks, Tehran appears increasingly confident that a war of endurance works in its favour. Washington may be seeking a rapid resolution but Iran’s calculation is precisely the opposite. Time, attrition and political fatigue will improve its negotiating position. The new Supreme Leader has reportedly drawn a red line around Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, which are viewed by Tehran as a central component of national deterrence, not a negotiable bargaining chip.

Through the lens of sixth-century BC war theorist Sun Tzu, victory is not only about battlefield dominance, but also the gradual exhaustion of the opponent’s will. In other words, not losing can matter as much as winning, especially when the other side is unable to achieve its declared objectives. As such, Iran’s experience may not represent triumph in the traditional sense, but if the oft-repeated chess analogy holds true, Tehran has undoubtedly demonstrated an ability to keep pieces in play across the regional board and frustrate its opponents’ objectives. Whether this amounts merely to a check or ultimately to checkmate remains to be seen.