The Democrats’ narrow path back to power

With most primaries completed, the 2026 midterms are taking shape. What does history say?

In 2024, the dynamics of the US presidential election contained so many similarities to 1968 that they cannot be summarised briefly. I wrote about some for Engelsberg Ideas, including President Biden’s decision to withdraw, stronger than usual third-party candidates, and the aftermath of the Democratic convention in Chicago. After most analysts thought it was too late for Biden to withdraw, something we had not seen since Lyndon Johnson, he did so nine days after my essay was published. While no historical analogy is perfect – nor does history repeat itself, despite the popular saying – it can be a companion that helps to make sense of the present.

However, does the 1968 analogy still hold, or have we moved on? Does another work better?

Starting first with the Republicans, as the incumbent party currently holding the House, the Senate, and the White House, the best analogy might be 1958. The number one question about Dwight Eisenhower in his final two years was whether he had created a movement with heirs or was simply a unique figure. The same could be asked of Trump. The same qualities that marked Eisenhower’s young, energetic and ambitious vice president, Richard Nixon, describe J.D. Vance.

Then as now, the number one issue for voters is the economy. Voters were shaken by rising inflation, economic anxiety, and the recession of 1957-1958 which hit states like Ohio and Michigan especially hard due to its impact on the automotive industry. Then as now, turbulence in the Middle East – Lebanon and the Suez Crisis before it – prompted Americans to be cautious, anxious, and fearful of a larger global conflict. With Americans tired of Republican rule, Democrats romped home, increasing their representation in the House from 235 to 283, picking up 15 seats in the Senate for a total of 64, and adding six governorships for a total of 35.

For the Democrats, if their tough year in 2024 was mostly a re-run of 1968, they have important decisions ahead. A tendency by some is to explain a close loss in terms of not being progressive enough – not giving voters a clear enough alternative to the Republican candidate. While lurching leftwards excites activists, it also risks alienating moderates. In the 1970 midterms, the decision by Democrats to remain relatively moderate resulted in picking up 12 seats in the House, expanding their majority with 255 seats held, but also losing 3 seats in the Senate while narrowing their margin to 54 to 44 (with two seats held by third parties). The most important result of those midterms for Democrats was arguably picking up 11 governorships.

If history is any guide – the president’s party almost always loses seats – Democrats are likely to perform well in 2026. But where do they go from here? After their success in 1970, they made the mistake of shifting leftwards by nominating Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. First elected to the Senate in 1962, after serving two terms in the House, he operated largely as an acolyte of the two-time presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson, since the politics of his state limited further leftwards movement. But there is a difference between a candidate’s background and the message of a campaign.

McGovern’s campaign in 1972 was arguably the first experiment Democrats had in the modern era with being a progressive party. McGovern embraced virtually every major progressive cause, including opposition to the Vietnam War and sweeping proposals for social and economic equality – which critics pejoratively summarised as approving of ‘acid, amnesty, and abortion.’ It was more than a presidential campaign; it was a litmus test to see whether voters were willing to push the nation in a progressive direction. McGovern lost decisively in one of the four great landslides of the 20^th century. Even South Dakota – the voters who elected him to the House and Senate – went for Nixon. Only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia went for McGovern.

The lesson for Democrats is that after losing by a close margin in 1968, it was a mistake to shift leftwards in 1972. But history shows that before they could get to 1976, when moderates and pragmatists asserted themselves by nominating Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, first they had to endure the mistakes of 1972. If moderates take control this year, they could repeat the success of 1970 and skip over 1972 to 1976. If progressives take control, they are less likely to make the gains necessary to prepare them for success in 2028. They will still have time for a course correction, but if they miss that opportunity they could be looking at another McGovern disaster.

For Republicans, assuming they stay near the centre, a Democratic shift to the left would be the best possible scenario. In that case, it might not be 1958-1960 but rather 1986-1988. They are still likely to lose in 2026 – in 1986 their losses were a modest 5 seats in the House, 8 seats in the Senate, while actually picking up 8 governorships. Facing a more liberal opponent in 1988, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, Vice President George H.W. Bush became the only sitting vice president since the war to win the presidency.

What could doom J.D. Vance (or Marco Rubio) in 2028 is that he will be forced to run on change and continuity simultaneously. Vance will be seen as Trump’s chief defender while also proposing ideas of his own. One could ask: if his new ideas are so great, why weren’t they implemented during the past four years? New proposals will also illuminate potential differences with Trump – on whom Vance will continue to depend. Despite turning 80, Trump shows no sign of going anywhere. His endorsement remains the most important for Republicans running in every office from US Senate down to county dog catcher. Each day that passes between now and 2028, Vance will need to find a way to retain Trump’s assets but minimise his liabilities. He will also need to figure out what to do about Trump himself. Since he will be impossible to control, Vance might need to come up with a device – like President Emeritus. That way, Trump remains part of the team going forward and less likely to turn against Vance.

If this seems too complicated for Republicans, that’s because it is. Democrats have an easier path, making 2026 and 2028 theirs to lose. Vance, like Nixon, will be young enough to run again in the future and might even benefit from doing something else for a few years before returning as a wiser and more experienced version of himself. His fate, like that of the Democrats as a whole, is in the hands of the progressives. Whether they can be harnessed in a way that unites the party, or at least minimises their disagreements, will be the difference between historic gains and historic losses. If progressives ignore the lessons of history, then Vance (or Rubio) might defy them, too.