It is no secret that the success of Israel’s military operation in Iran, coupled with the Islamic Republic’s own reckless actions, has reignited the issue of regime change in Iran. In fact, only one day before the ceasefire, President Trump himself, for the first time, raised the possibility of regime change in Tehran. Throughout the 12-Day War, although the Israeli government stated that toppling the Islamic Republic was not its official objective, it did simultaneously acknowledge that its actions could create the conditions for regime change. Now, as the dust settles from the conflict, the key long-term objective for Israel, the US and Arab states in the Persian Gulf is to ensure that the three pillars of the Iranian regime’s military doctrine, which have been the root-cause for destabilisation in the Middle East – nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and Islamist proxies – are fully and permanently dismantled.

In the past decade, the very term ‘regime change’ has been a toxic taboo with negative connotations – not least after failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even President Trump acknowledged that the term was not ‘politically correct’ in his recent assertion. But in the past few months, in particular after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria in December 2024, the concept of regime change has resurfaced as a viable foreign policy position. This is especially the case in relation to the Islamic Republic in Iran, where previous policies of containment and engagement have failed to produce sustainable, successful outcomes.

Yet, while policymakers, military officials, and experts are now more freely discussing the concept of regime change in Iran, they all have different interpretations of what this actually means in practice.

When discussing ‘regime change’, it is essential to recognise that the term can have multiple interpretations. These generally fall into three categories: ‘soft’ regime change, ‘semi-hard’ regime change, and ‘hard’ regime change.

The concept of ‘soft’ regime change refers to the idea that, by imposing sufficient costs on the political leadership of a rogue regime, the political actors will eventually abandon their existing problematic policies and ideological commitments. Advocates for ‘soft’ regime change in Iran have long claimed that, by imposing significant costs on the regime, it could embolden so-called ‘moderate’ factions in the Islamic Republic’s leadership to assume power.

In Iran’s case, however, due to the structure of the deep-state institutions within the regime, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Office of the Supreme Leader, which have been empowered over the past three decades, the possibility of so-called ‘moderate’ factions gaining power is nothing but wishful thinking. The history of the Islamic Republic in the past three decades makes this explicitly clear: each time so-called ‘moderates’ have assumed political office, they have been unsuccessful in challenging the authority of the Supreme Leader’s Office or the IRGC.

More importantly, the deep-state institutions are not only thoroughly embedded across every aspect of power in the regime, but they are fully armed and able to deploy force to preserve their authority. As the past has demonstrated, any behavioural change witnessed in the Islamic Republic, such as the 2015 nuclear deal, will almost certainly be temporary or, in the words of Khamenei himself, a ‘tactical concession’, rather than a substantive change.

In other words, while the regime may make a short-term concession if its survival is threatened, it will simply pick up where it left off at any given opportunity, as was the case with its nuclear weapons programme. In the context of war with Israel, this means that although the Iranian regime’s political leadership has suffered huge costs, it is highly unlikely to change its policies or ideological identity due to the structure of the Islamic Republic. Even after the war, Khamenei and the IRGC continue to push the same ideological narrative, vowing to maintain the three pillars of the military doctrine. In short, given the historical record, the ‘soft’ regime change option in Iran is highly unlikely.

‘Semi-hard’ regime change involves the elimination of the existing political and military leadership of a rogue regime in the hope that it will produce an elite coup or provide the space for younger generations within the existing system to rise to power and adopt new policies.

In the context of Iran, for example, some scholars have advocated for the IRGC to stage a coup against the clergy as a viable alternative, citing Pakistan or Egypt as examples. Others argue that eliminating the current senior military leadership, as Israel has done, could open the door for younger and more pragmatic IRGC personnel to occupy positions of power.

Concerning the former, unlike the Egyptian and Pakistani militaries, the IRGC is not an autonomous institution with an independent identity. Since its inception in 1979, the IRGC has emerged as the bodyguards of the ruling clergy and has since developed as their praetorian guard. Its identity is rooted in the Shia Islamist concept of velayat-e faqih – or clerical supremacy. The ruling clergy has ensured control over the IRGC through numerous mechanisms, including stringent recruitment processes, ideological indoctrination, and purges. In other words, members of the IRGC are simply clerics in military uniforms. In fact, as part of their selection and indoctrination, they even undergo the same Shia seminary (hawza) studies as the ruling clerics.

Likewise, the idea of the rise of a younger and more pragmatic generation does not apply in the context of the IRGC. The younger ranks of the IRGC are, in fact, more ideological and radical than their predecessors.

This leaves ‘hard’ regime change as the final option. ‘Hard’ regime change involves not only replacing political leaders but dismantling the ruling system, including its ideology and elite. In the context of Iran, this is the only way to bring about genuine and lasting change to the policies and identity of the existing status quo, transitioning the country away from a revolutionary cause to a normal nation-state.

Practically speaking, a ‘hard’ regime change can be achieved through three means: foreign imposition, foreign support, or a popular revolution.

The first option – namely, a foreign-imposed regime change – often involves a full-scale invasion with ground troops to overthrow the existing government. While the 12-Day War showed that the Islamic Republic lacks significant military strength (similar to Saddam Hussein’s Baathist army, which collapsed in just 19 days in 2003), the idea of a foreign-imposed regime change in Iran remains deeply unpopular because of past experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Subsequently, there is no political appetite or economic bandwidth in the West to implement this option. Perhaps more importantly, in the case of Iran, the nature of widespread anti-regime sentiment amongst the population renders this option unnecessary.

But how realistic is a popular revolution in Iran? This option is advocated by most Iranian civil society activists and opposition groups. Yet while many view it as the preferred option for hard regime change, it does not take into account the reality of the Islamic Republic’s extensive suppressive machinery on the ground.

In the last few decades, every time the Iranian people have taken to the streets in nationwide anti-regime protests, including as recently as 2022-2023, they have been brutally repressed by the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus. The experience of the past half century has demonstrated explicitly that a successful popular uprising in Iran is extremely difficult to achieve without external support due to the strength and extensive nature of the regime’s security networks. This extensive suppressive apparatus, which cuts across every layer of Iranian society, remains largely intact even after the 12-Day War, with Israel’s operations primarily targeting the military and nuclear infrastructure of the regime.

The challenge of the repressive apparatus could be dealt with through a foreign-supported regime change scenario, where external actors weaken the suppressive infrastructure of the regime. Opponents of this option cite the outcome in Libya as a cautionary example, where foreign intervention, primarily in the form of air strikes, led not only to the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, but to prolonged civil war and the country’s fragmentation. Iran and Libya differ significantly in their political histories, demographic and cultural structures, and social composition.

First, Libya is a relatively new nation, established in 1951 following the Second World War. In contrast, Iran is one of the world’s oldest continuous civilisations, with a state history stretching back over 2,500 years. Under Gaddafi, Libya functioned mainly as a tribal society, with Gaddafi himself acting as a tribal chief who maintained cohesion among the country’s various clans and regions. With the collapse of his regime, this fragile balance unravelled, leading to fragmentation, particularly between East and West, where distinct ethnic and tribal groups dominate.

In contrast, Iran, despite its ethnic diversity, has existed as a unified civilisation for millennia. The modern Iranian state took shape under the Safavid dynasty in 1501, establishing a centralised government that was later modernised through the creation of a fully-fledged modern bureaucracy under the Pahlavi dynasty, beginning in 1921. Unlike Libya, Iran has a deeply rooted national identity and a long-standing tradition of civil society. Iranians have coexisted as a multi-ethnic nation for centuries, and since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06, they have consistently advocated for a more representative and accountable political system.

Foreign-supported regime change in Iran would therefore yield fundamentally different outcomes, owing to Iran’s deep-rooted historical continuity, cohesive social fabric, rich cultural identity, and enduring institutional legacies.

In the final few days of the 12-Day War, Israel began to target the security apparatus of the regime, but this only scratched the surface, with the extensive security web largely remaining intact. The existence of this extensive suppressive machinery is the most significant barrier to productive change in Iran. The weakening of the Islamic Republic’s suppressive apparatus could certainly create the space for the Iranian people to mobilise effectively. In such a scenario, a foreign power – such as Israel or even the US – could provide air support to protect protesters by striking the regime’s security headquarters, command centres, and units, which have historically crushed uprisings with brutal force.

With Israel having already shifted the strategic balance, there may be a genuine opportunity for the Iranian people to reclaim their future from the regime’s grip. While the regime showed an ability to sustain power through internal repression against a defenceless Iranian population, that equation changes if the suppressive machinery is significantly weakened through external support.

Some continue to argue that regime change in Iran remains unrealistic and untenable – but if the 12-Day War revealed anything, it is that the Islamic Republic is far weaker than previously believed.