Drone footage released by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s final moments was rich in symbols. For Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu it was the triumphant realisation of a war aim; for the hostages’ relatives it brought a moment of hope that their loved ones’ release is now closer; and for Hamas it provided an image of their leader’s final act of defiance and, for them, martyrdom. The footage also showed graphically the rubble of what was once Gaza. That rubble may prove deeply political.

Whether ‘rubblisation’ was an Israeli war aim or a by-product of the heavy fighting will remain controversial. As an outcome of the war, it is undeniable. The UN Environmental Programme estimates that there are now 42 million tonnes of rubble in the Gaza Strip, much of it contaminated with toxic chemicals and ordnance, which will take $1.2bn to clear. Estimates vary depending on the area, but in Gaza City as much as 85 per cent of the built environment, including utilities, schools and hospitals, is now destroyed. The rubble dwarfs the scale of destruction created in previous conflicts in Gaza. The task of clearing it will be enormous and complex.

The international community’s awareness of the physical destruction has been limited by tight Israeli restrictions on press reporting from Gaza, but, despite this, open-source imagery shot from the sky has clearly shown the dramatic rate of depletion of standing buildings. It will be a bracing moment when Gaza is re-opened and the level of destruction can be observed first hand by visitors rather than reported. That may prove a tipping point in public opinion outside Israel.

Neither has destruction of the physical environment finished. There is, as yet, no indication that the death of Sinwar will lead to a cessation of the IDF’s kinetic activity. IDF attacks continue on targets in the south and on the long-term Palestinian refugee camps, such as Jabaliya, which have been havens for Hamas. They are already heavily damaged. Israel is also continuing a highly kinetic campaign in Lebanon, including in urban centres, most notably Beirut. It has issued evacuation orders for several population centres in southern Lebanon, which may herald more heavy attacks. Displaced persons and rubble go hand-in-hand. And dealing with the rubble is a necessary if not sufficient precondition for the return of displaced persons.

The level of urban destruction in Gaza brings with it a new kind of challenge, one not merely on a new scale. So much of Gaza will require rebuilding that there is an opportunity for not merely reconstructing but redesigning the built environment entirely. Redesigning is far more controversial than reconstruction, but the ‘status quo ante’ may be in many places no longer recoverable given the destruction of property registers, boundaries and the degree of ground contamination. More significantly, it may no longer be desirable for key parties, above all Israel.

Israel wants to manage intelligence collection and operational interventions in what was Gaza’s densely populated and impenetrable urban environment. Netanyahu has indicated his intent to retain influence over Gaza’s security and to change its topography by maintaining a military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor on the Egyptian border and in the newly created Netzarim Corridor in the north, which bisects the strip. Given this intent, his government is unlikely to entrust the task of clearance and reconstruction to what will be a fledgling Palestinian Authority in Gaza, even if backed by an international consortium.

Some may prosper in the rubble. Post-conflict landscapes, where communities and physical infrastructure are shattered, are notorious breeding grounds for warlordism, criminality and terrorism. Criminality in Gaza has already increased significantly as shortages of food and fuel have been manipulated by organised gangs. Controlling the movement in, out and within Gaza is likely to remain a priority for the Israelis, for whom criminal and terrorist groups are uncomfortably similar. The ability of a new Palestinian Authority to deal with entrenched criminal groups will be scrutinised closely by the Israelis and constitute another reason for their retaining active oversight.

The humanitarian imperative for dealing immediately with Gaza’s rubble is manifest. The longer it is left, the more likely contamination will spread, disease will become endemic and criminal groups will organise. While NGOs and the UN can be expected to continue to make the case for urgent action, the agendas of political actors across the spectrum may conspire to obstruct progress.

Within Israel security is likely to remain the dominant consideration. There will be a widespread expectation that any rehabilitation of Gaza must be proofed against rehabilitation of Hamas. Extreme elements within Israel may prefer to see Gaza made unliveable and depopulated, creating, in the words of the Roman historian Tacitus, a desolation and calling it peace. While a desolation, it would also be available in due course for resettlement. Even according to less extreme views, it may be hard for the Israeli state to trust the Palestinian Authority to reconstruct Gaza in such a way that it cannot harbour terrorist capabilities. They would want some guaranteed oversight. But that will complicate the decision to engage in Gaza for international partners. Commercial entities and NGOs, which will be critical for the essential first task of clearing mines and ordnance, will have to weigh the benefits of deploying to Gaza against the possible reputational damage of working to Israeli conditions.

The core issue will be the sequencing of the politics and reconstruction efforts. Setting political conditions relating to the final status of Palestine for participation in reconstruction is risky. In the current climate in Israel where fear of enemies on the border is so high and support for a two-state solution is so low, there is a danger that these conditions could create an indefinite delay and the gradual normalisation of a ruined Gaza.

Reconstruction is also problematic for Iran and its ‘Axis of Resistance’. The Axis has predictably responded to the death of Sinwar with the rhetoric of martyrdom, sacrifice and existential war against Israel. That will find resonance among now battle-hardened fighters in the rubble of Gaza and in south Lebanon, but that resonance will be weaker once the rubblisation of Israel’s perimeter stops and clearance becomes possible. The Axis will hope that it can rebuild its base once populations return to their houses and communities are reconstituted. Israel may, for its own security reasons, actively prevent both. In which case the Axis will have a difficult choice between sabotaging violently any attempts to clear and rebuild, unless its maximalist demands are met, and allowing it to happen but seeing the human and physical environment in which it has thrived disappear. The loss of its ‘habitus’ may be far more difficult to survive than the loss of its leaders and ordnance.

Continuing resistance, to the point of martyrdom, will be in direct tension with Gazans who just want to live. The most basic needs of the population will be physical, not political. Research in the ruined cities of Syria showed that political settlement was a very low priority among residents when set against physical reconstruction. When it comes to rubble, pragmatism rather than principle might best serve the needs of so traumatised a population.