During his presidential campaign, President-elect Donald Trump promised to find a quick settlement to the Ukrainian war. There is often a vast gap between electoral promises and what any president can deliver. But the gap becomes even wider in foreign policy, in matters of war and peace. Can Trump help end this war? It would be a major feat if he did. But the odds are stacked high against this outcome.

To understand how this war may end, it is important to assess Vladimir Putin’s goals. True, his goal posts have moved before, and can move again. Yet, several issues stand out as particularly intractable.

First, Ukraine’s permanent neutrality. Putin has claimed that the prospect of Ukraine’s accession to NATO was a key reason for Russia’s invasion. Such claims must be taken with a grain of salt, since they fail to account for Putin’s blatant, rapacious imperialism. Be that as it may, the Kremlin has consistently highlighted Ukraine’s neutrality as a sine qua non of any future settlement.

Indeed, during their ill-fated peace talks in 2022 (known as the Istanbul talks, though they began in Belarus, continued in Istanbul, and ended, ingloriously, on Zoom), Russian and Ukrainian negotiators attempted to define precisely what Ukraine’s neutrality would look like. The sticking point was guarantees. Understandably, Kyiv insisted on real guarantees, which would commit Ukraine’s Western partners – first and foremost the United States – to the country’s defense.

If Trump were to tackle this matter, he would discover, quickly, that there are two basic problems. NATO has already committed itself, albeit vaguely, to Ukraine’s membership. Indeed, the alliance’s Washington Summit declaration (July 10, 2024) states plainly that ‘Ukraine’s future is in NATO.’ True, a declaration has no legal power, and reneging on this promise (which in any case will be hard to keep) is not technically impossible, even if doing so would entail a certain loss of face.

But this is only half the problem. Suppose Ukraine agreed to permanent neutrality. Could the United States offer viable guarantees, committing itself to Kyiv’s defense in any future war with Russia? And will Putin accept such guarantees, given that in Istanbul the Russians deliberately tried to water them down by insisting on the principle of unanimity among guarantor-states (including Russia itself)? These are not minor questions, but their resolution could open a path to a settlement.

If the question of neutrality were to be successfully tackled, Trump would immediately face another problem: territory. Since 2022 Russia has formally annexed not just the two break-away statelets (the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic) but also two other Ukrainian regions, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, though it still does not control all of the territories that it has formally annexed. Putin has not given any indications that he would be willing to retreat from the territories that the Russians have occupied.

The United States has certain cards. The key among these is the formal recognition of certain occupied territories as ‘Russian.’ There is no doubt that Putin covets such recognition, for it would have the effect of legitimizing his control of territories acquired through conquest.

Even if Trump does not care about the ultimate disposition of Crimea, never mind the war-ravaged wasteland of Donbas, recognising any occupied territory as legitimately Russian would be a precarious undertaking. It would set a highly undesirable precedent and expose the White House to criticism that it is appeasing an aggressor in a tragic repeat of Munich. And this is before we account for Kyiv’s view on the surrender of its territories. Getting Zelenskyy to agree to such a sordid deal will be a first-rate challenge.

Third, the Ukrainian army. Putin has claimed, wrongly, that in Istanbul Russia and Ukraine effectively agreed on a deal (before Boris Johnson allegedly ruined it by telling Zelenskyy to fight on). In reality, the two sides remained far apart on the key question of the size of the Ukrainian armed forces, and the equipment it would be allowed to have. Since then, Ukraine’s army has proven its effectiveness and resilience on the battlefield.

Putin would be very worried by any peace deal that would leave Ukraine with a modern military force that could resist Russia’s incursions or potentially attempt to retake the lost territories. Zelenskyy, too, understands that maintaining a strong military is Ukraine’s best guarantee of national survival. Trump will find it difficult, or perhaps altogether impossible, to square this circle.

Fourth, Ukraine’s domestic legislation. Russia has a bizarre fixation on amending a number of Ukrainian laws, in particular those that deal with historical memory and language. This is what hides behind the ambitious project of ‘de-Nazification,’ which Putin has made one of his aims in this war. The Ukrainians have rightly claimed that these demands represent a humiliating, unwarranted interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs.

It remains to be seen whether Zelenskyy will reconsider his approach should a peace deal become a practical possibility, or whether Putin will finally give up on his efforts to russify Ukraine in return for some juicy concession.

Fifth, sanctions relief. This is perhaps one area where the United States has very important cards to play. Despite Putin’s best efforts to put on a brave face, it is hardly a secret that Russia’s economy is facing significant challenges. Removing sanctions, and agreeing to release Russia’s frozen foreign assets, would be an important carrot that President Trump could offer Putin in return for his cooperation. There are complexities in store. For example, Trump would also have to bring his European allies around to follow suit. Important questions would have to be asked about postwar reconstruction: who would foot the bill?

Any would-be peace negotiator would be daunted by the enormity of the task at hand. But behind these issues lurks an uncertainty. Will Putin even want to negotiate? Sure, he may agree to meet and talk. After all, he who holds the banner of peace has the moral advantage. But it may well be that after investing so heavily in re-gearing Russia for war, after paying such a high price in blood and treasure, Putin will want to continue the war until Ukraine falls, and Russian troops march through Kyiv.

Trump, in his anxious determination to bring the war to a prompt close, may soon discover that Putin has a different timeline, and indeed a different goal. For Putin’s goal is not so much to end the war, but to win it. And he has already shown that he can patiently and methodically advance towards this goal.

Faced with such a determined, resourceful opponent, Trump will grow frustrated and blame his failures on Zelenskyy’s stubborn refusal to compromise. If, in his frustration, Trump pulls the plug on the US support of Ukraine, he will make Putin’s task much easier.

And in the end, the American President may well choose to give up on Ukraine altogether, and so end the war, as he had promised, by letting Russia win it.