JD Vance’s hope for a Hungarian Europe

  • Themes: Geopolitics, History, Hungary

The US Vice President views Viktor Orbán’s Hungary as a key battleground in his quest for an alternative civilisational order in Europe, as well as a vital test for his vision of a Eurocentric America.

US Vice President JD Vance and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attend a rally in Budapest, Hungary, ahead of the Hungarian parliamentary elections.
US Vice President JD Vance and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán attend a rally in Budapest, Hungary, ahead of the Hungarian parliamentary elections. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc.

Reading The Kennan Diaries, one is struck by the fact that the father of the great American diplomat George Kennan was called Kossuth Kennan, after the Hungarian liberal nationalist Lajos Kossuth. The Hungarian nationalist was an interesting character. His bust is in the US Capitol as one of the foremost liberal European nationalists of the revolutionary year of 1848. He was also, apparently, ethnically Slovak but considered Magyar, showing how ambivalent the idea of ethnicity was among nationalists in 19th century Europe, and how, paradoxically, nationalism started as a liberal, particularist, but fundamentally ethno-neutral project, opposed to any transnational progressive empire.

Hungary’s greatest achievement in the 19th century, as AJP Taylor wrote, was to manage a compromise between the primarily Hungarian masses and a distinctly cosmopolitan elite. As he expressed it, ‘in Hungary the intellectuals, even if Slovak or Rumanian by origin, could become “Magyar” like the gentry’. Notably, Gladys Vanderbilt, the American heiress, was also a Hungarian Countess by marriage.

Statues of Lajos Kossuth can also be found all across Budapest, from a black, forward-marching avatar found in the biggest university campus in central Budapest, to a white, pristine, post-communist one, currently located in the Parliament Square. Such is the nature of historical memory, that Kossuth is simultaneously a liberal and nationalist, co-opted by both the left and the right, his original intention and inspiration lost to time, and in a classic Hungarian fashion, entwined but distinct from the rest of Europe.

The Hungarian elite’s tradition of being both nationalist and cosmopolitan continued in the 20th century, but in exile, owing to significant migration to the United States. So much so that Ohio (the state of the current Vice President JD Vance) once had the highest concentration of Hungarian-Americans in the country, where they formed the second largest minority population within the state. Vance, who is currently touring Hungary ahead of the pivotal election, recently chose Budapest as the location for a major foreign policy intervention, reinforcing his vision of a Eurocentric-America, stating that ‘Americans were birthed in the continent’, and supporting Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s vision of state sovereignty, non-intervention, and realism, against further European integration.

Beyond the rhetoric, it makes strategic sense that Hungary is so important to the current US administration, and that has nothing to do with Hungarian-American historic ties. Hungary occupies a distinct pivot point within the European Union as one of the very few member states advocating for an immediate ceasefire and peace negotiations rather than sustained military support for Ukraine. Although it condemns Russia’s aggression, the Hungarian government has placed greater emphasis on de-escalation since at least 2022. This approach reflects a traditional Hungarian propensity for realism and detachment: indeed, the first cannon-maker for the Ottomans was a Hungarian named Orbán. But as Taylor correctly identified, Hungary’s historic realism stems from its geographic position, in this case, proximity to conflict and a shared border with Ukraine, concerns about the Ukrainian government’s decision to conscript ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia, and the significant humanitarian burden of accommodating more than a million refugees under simplified asylum procedures.

Hungarian officials also argue that EU sanctions have produced unintended consequences, contributing to an energy crisis, rising inflation and industrial strain that affect European populations more severely than Russia, which continues to benefit from high global energy prices, and that meaningful peace negotiations can only be achieved through engagement between the United States and Russia, as smaller states lack the influence to shape outcomes. This realism also extends to Orbán’s caution about Ukraine’s rapid accession to NATO, a point further echoed in the US National Security Strategy of 2025.

Orbánism can be understood as a complex and somewhat paradoxical model, as a form of ‘reactionary vanguardism’, in which a disciplined governing elite uses modern state mechanisms to pursue goals associated with national conservatism. Unlike earlier vanguard models that aimed at progressive or universal transformation, this approach focuses on reinforcing sovereignty, cultural continuity and traditional social structures, and a commitment to socially conservative values such as border security, traditional definitions of marriage and the preservation of national culture. While Orbán continues to advocate reforming the European Union from within rather than leaving it, his government faces ongoing legal and financial pressures from EU institutions, including rule-of-law procedures and fines. As a result, Hungary represents a hybrid system that combines centralised governance with resistance to liberal international norms. Orbán’s earlier declarations about building an illiberal state is presented by supporters as an effort to organise society around national priorities rather than as a rejection of democracy.

Despite these tensions, the Hungarians understand more than anyone that they cannot survive withdrawing from the EU. In an ironic way, therefore, Hungary acts both as a testing ground for and as an influence on emerging political strategies elsewhere, particularly among groups in the United States and the United Kingdom that are exploring similar approaches, even if direct replication remains unlikely in larger and more diverse societies. Hungary functions as a case study suggesting that a country can resist deeper ideological convergence while maintaining economic functionality and political stability, at least in the short to medium term.

Hungarian power was eclipsed in the 16th century due to geopolitical pressures emanating from the ambitions of Habsburg emperors, Ottoman sultans and Russian tsars. Hungarian influence in the arts and sciences, and political consciousness, however, flourished under the Habsburgs, with Budapest being the second most powerful imperial city after Vienna. Through their experience of the downfall of the Habsburgs, and the rise of Nazis and Soviets, Hungarians have a deep understanding of what it feels like to be subjugated under a transnational bureaucracy, an experience that the Orbán government isn’t willing to endure under any further European integration.

Within this context, Orbán’s Hungary stands at a critical juncture. Continued success in the upcoming elections would allow his model to persist, but would also bring growing pressure from the EU, including political intervention, external influence or domestic unrest. Orbán’s loss, on the other hand, would probably accelerate Hungary’s reintegration into mainstream EU norms, and lead to the dissolution of his bastion of foreign policy realism. The former Conservative leader Lord Hague’s principle of being within the EU without being ruled by the EU, failed in a country as large as the United Kingdom. Orbán’s elite will eventually have to face the similar challenges. The long-term viability of ‘Orbánism’ therefore depends on not just Hungary’s ability to remain within the European Union while preserving its social cohesion and national identity, but also on an American victory in a US-EU cold war.

Lajos Kossuth visited the US in 1851, during the presidency of Millard Filmore, where he was the second foreigner after the Marquis de Lafayette to address a joint meeting of the US Congress. He then continued to travel in Ohio, and gave a speech at the request of Ohio governor Reuben Wood, who was arguably a huge admirer, and introduced Kossuth to Americans, saying ‘another subject of universal interest to the American people is the arrival of the Hungarian patriot upon our shores. It has created an excitement, in the bosoms of freemen, only equalled by the landing of our own Lafayette’.

Kossuth did not disappoint in his speeches: ‘the spirit of our age is democracy. All for the people, and all by the people. Nothing about the people without the people’. It is a somewhat fascinating reversal now that a former Senator from Ohio, and current Vice President, is now touring Budapest and reminding Europeans of the spirit of 1848. Kossuth, of course, refused to accept the eventual Austro-Hungarian compromise, whereby Hungary remained within the empire until the end of the First World War.

It will be interesting to see if Orbán can continue to buck the trend in Europe. The verdict of history on Vance’s forays into European diplomacy, and of his vision for a Eurocentric America, is yet to be written.

Author

Sumantra Maitra

Sumantra Maitra is the Director of Research and Outreach at the American Ideas Institute, an elected Fellow at the Royal Historical Society, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Renewing America. He is also an Advisor to the congressional Greenland caucus.

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