Throughout history, adaptation has been a key element in violent conflict. Whenever one side develops a new technology or tactic that provides them with a crucial advantage, the other side has to find ways to adapt, or perish. The conflict in Lebanon is no exception.

A large number of electronic pagers exploded in Lebanon on 17 September 2024. According to early estimates, a dozen people may have been killed and 2,700 wounded. The most likely explanation seems to be that small explosive charges, capable of being triggered remotely, had been planted inside the devices. Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese manufacturer of electronic pagers, claimed that a Hungarian company called BAC Consulting had manufactured the exploding devices under license. However, the people behind BAC Consulting seem to have disappeared and Hungarian authorities claim that BAC Consulting was a mere trading intermediary, and that the devices had never been in Hungary.

Before the debate on the mechanics, motives and justification of this event had time to simmer down, a second wave of explosions hit Lebanon the day after the attack via pagers. This time, the most frequently mentioned type of device involved in the explosions was a ‘walkie-talkie’, i.e. a hand-held two-way radio. The Japanese radio manufacturer Icom soon found itself in the spotlight, as pictures of debris from its IC-V82 radios started to emerge in various media channels. However, Icom argues that the radios involved in the explosions were counterfeit copies. These illicit IC-V82 clones have supposedly been easily obtainable for years on Chinese e-commerce platforms.

This somewhat confusing story, the details of which are still emerging at the time of writing, begs several questions. Why were pagers and radios in such seemingly widespread use in an era of much more sophisticated mobile phones? Why and how were these devices targeted, and how certain are we that we know by whom?

The answer to the first question is likely related to Israeli signals intelligence. Individuals affiliated with Hizbollah were warned not to carry or use mobile phones, since these can be tracked by Israeli agencies. As shown by several waves of recent court cases in which encrypted phones used by criminals were compromised, as well as interceptions/localisations during the war in Ukraine, mobile phones have numerous inherent vulnerabilities. I argued two years ago that a rational response by users of clandestine communications, such as criminal and terrorist organisations, would be to revert to older technologies. A pager, for example, is effectively a one-way communications device that cannot be used to track the location of an individual, and will reveal no more than an absolute minimum of potentially sensitive information if it falls into the wrong hands. By broadcasting coded messages to the pagers, a large number of people can be coordinated effectively. While the message that is being broadcast can be intercepted with relative ease, its recipients can remain hidden.

The devices affected by the second wave of explosions, the two-way radios, or what professionals refer to as transceivers (transmitter/receiver), are typically handheld devices used for short-range communication. These are used by first responders, security guards, law enforcement, hunters, and so on. The advantage of using a handheld radio over a mobile phone is that the former does not require any type of infrastructure, including cellular coverage. Two or more identical radios can communicate with each other without any intermediaries. This also makes them much more difficult to localise than mobile phones, since the signal does not travel far and does not bounce off cellular towers. While a radio can be intercepted and localised, this requires physical proximity in order to detect the signal. Unless the adversary is close by and set up to listen, the transmission can easily go undetected. In addition, the radio can typically only be localised while it is transmitting, whereas a mobile phone only needs to be switched on, allowing for a higher degree of control.

We have an answer as to why Hizbollah was using pagers and radios: communications security. Their widespread use explains why these devices were targeted. The fact that thousands of pagers were in circulation indicates that they were used as a form of tactical communications device. A tactical device is something that is used regularly, for routine activities. Typically, this also results in a degree of reliance on the device. As its users become accustomed to it, they come to depend on it to coordinate. Thus, destroying the entire network in a single move will probably throw the organisation using them into total disarray. In addition, given the numbers involved and simple probability, key individuals may be expected to have been carrying these devices, and, as a result, become casualties.

The procedure used to compromise the devices seems to involve both a front company and, for the second wave, counterfeit copies. These are typically indicators of what is known as a supply-chain infiltration. There are previous examples of supply-chain operations staged by intelligence agencies, one of the most notable being the operation in which the CIA and the West German intelligence agency BND bought a Swiss company producing encryption devices, and then added backdoors to their products which allowed the CIA and BND to read the encrypted messages. These devices were sold worldwide for decades to unsuspecting governments, including the Argentinian regime, which, as a result, had its communications read by British and American intelligence during the Falklands War of 1982. Few organisations have the capability to manage a supply chain infiltration on this scale, especially one that involves hiding explosives. This – in combination with the current geopolitical situation and previously documented examples of Israeli use of explosives concealed in communications devices to carry out assassinations – indicates Israeli involvement.

The story of the exploding pagers and radios features spectacular elements, but is also a typical example of adaptation. Israeli interception and localisation forced Hizbollah to adopt other means of communication. Having lost their previous advantage, the Israelis (presumably) found new ways to regain the upper hand. We can be reasonably sure that Hizbollah is already trying to adapt to this new situation. The only question that remains is: what will be the next move?