A revisionist regional power seeks to dominate the Middle East. Spurred by opportunism and avarice, an external power supports this bid for hegemony from afar. A coalition mobilises against the would-be hegemon to maintain the status quo. The Levant is the epicentre of the crisis.

This is today’s Middle East. Following the 7 October massacre, Iran launched a campaign to bludgeon Israel and undermine the American-led Middle Eastern order. While Moscow provides Tehran with military support, the United States, Israel, Arab states, and European powers have coordinated to check Iran, defending Israel from Iranian missiles, bombing Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, and striking the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. While the crisis rages from Homs to Hodeidah, its focal point is the Levant.

The preceding description also applies to the long-forgotten ‘Oriental Crisis’ of 1840. Back then, a coalition of Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Turkey thwarted the designs of Muhammad Ali’s Egypt, backed by France, to cripple the Ottoman Empire and dominate the Middle East. The coalition achieved this via diplomacy and force, culminating in a military campaign in modern Lebanon and Israel. Both in 1840 and today, a coalition contained a regional hegemon supported by an external power in a climactic clash in the Levant.

The origins of the 1840 crisis were as complicated as they were fascinating. Muhammad Ali, the governor of Ottoman Egypt, had begun his career as a loyal proconsul. He defended Ottoman Egypt against a French invasion, reconquered the Hijaz on Turkey’s behalf, and dispatched troops to support Turkey during the 1821 Greek revolt.

Then, in 1831, Ali rebelled against Turkey. His forces smashed Turkish armies and threatened the Ottomans’ Anatolian heartland. Britain, which traditionally sought to preserve Turkey as a conduit to India, was distracted by domestic turmoil. With the empire’s survival at stake, the Ottomans turned to Turkey’s Erbfeind Russia for support. St. Petersburg dispatched ships and troops to Constantinople and intimidated Ali into making a peace deal. Subsequently, Russia and Turkey signed a defensive alliance giving Russia significant leverage over Constantinople.

In 1839, conflict again broke out between Egypt and Turkey. Once again, Egyptian troops routed their Ottoman counterparts. This time, the Ottoman fleet also defected to Ali. Yet again, the Ottoman Empire tottered on the brink of catastrophe.

At this juncture, British decision-makers, led by Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston, faced a profound crisis. The keystone of Britain’s Middle Eastern strategy was to prop up Turkey as a transit station on the way to British India and as a bulwark against Russian expansionism. That keystone was wobbling. What was worse, France appeared to align itself with Egypt against Britain.

In this crisis, Palmerston turned to diplomacy. Gathering in London in 1840, British policy-makers, along with their Russian, Austrian, and Prussian counterparts, pledged to protect Constantinople, if necessary by force. To mollify Ali, the powers offered him the hereditary viceroyalty of Egypt and control of Acre and southern Syria for his lifetime. The offer of the lifetime possessions would be withdrawn after ten days, the hereditary possession of Egypt after a same additional period. Either way, Ali would need to return the Ottoman fleet.

Ali allowed the first ten days to expire. Then, just before the second ten days ended, he accepted the territorial concessions allotted by this window, but refused to return the Turkish fleet. As a result, the coalition made good on its threat to intervene militarily. In September 1840, the British bombed Egyptian-controlled Beirut, while Ottoman infantry, supported by British and Austrian marines, attacked Egyptian forces across Lebanon. Over the next two months, the Egyptians in Beirut, Sidon, and Acre capitulated. After the British fleet appeared off Alexandria, Ali agreed to evacuate his forces from the Levant, return the Ottoman fleet, and accept the position of hereditary governor of Egypt. The crisis subsided. By organising an international coalition and deftly combining diplomatic coordination with military muscle, Britain had rescued Turkey, parried the Egyptian bid for hegemony, and salvaged the Middle Eastern order.

Today, the United States and its regional partners face a threat from Iran not dissimilar to that once posed by Egypt. Britain’s resolution of the 1840 crisis offers three key lessons regarding how to approach the Iranian problem today.

First, multilateral coalitions require a convening power to emerge. In 1840, Palmerston corralled a diverse group of powers into supporting the embattled Turks. United by their opposition to the Egyptian threat to the Middle Eastern order, they worked together even though they were rivals elsewhere. Today, America is the only power that can play a similar role in halting Iranian revisionism. Washington has already exhibited its ability to do so, most notably by spearheading the 13 April defence of Israel. It must continue to coordinate between the Israeli, Arab, and European interests imperiled by Iranian imperialism.

Ultimatums with expiration dates are valuable diplomatic tools. In 1840, the powers offered Ali a sliding scale of options that became worse over time. Today, Washington could use a similar approach towards Iran and its proxies, as the Gaza hostage negotiations stall, while the Lebanon ceasefire talks appear to be making progress. To jumpstart the former and advance the latter, Washington could couple threats to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran with firm expiration dates, after which it could utilise diplomatic, economic, or military tools against them.

Multilateral coalitions should allot responsibilities according to the comparative advantages of their constituents. In 1840, Britain, a sea power, concentrated on naval and amphibious operations. The Ottomans, lacking a fleet, used their ground forces. Prussia, a geographically distant land power, offered diplomatic support. A similar division of labour should occur today, with the United States and Israel taking the lead militarily, the European powers offering support, and Arab states focusing on intelligence assistance.

The Oriental Crisis reminds us that history remains a deep reservoir from which to extract inexact yet vital lessons for modern statecraft. It is up to policymakers to periodically draw from that well.