Amid the speculation and polemic about the dire situation in Iran, one thing most observers can agree on is that the regime has demonstrated its long-term failure: in economic and environmental management; its failure to maintain basic living standards in what should be a prosperous country; the failure of its foreign policy, either in winning reliable allies or in lifting sanctions. Perhaps most damningly, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated its inability to protect the country from Israeli and US airstrikes, let alone leverage its regional proxies to deliver its policy goals. In short, the regime has failed to achieve anything other than clinging onto power through the ruthless use of armed force against protestors. Even in that achievement, Iran’s rulers cannot believe that they have seen the last demonstrations for their overthrow.

Yet in some ways, the recent violence also marks a failure of western policy. Four decades of economic and political isolation have neither persuaded the regime to change its underlying behaviour, nor enabled the Iranian people to change their rulers. As in Cuba, so in Iran: decades of siege conditions have encouraged autocratic regimes to hunker down, portray domestic opposition as imperialist fifth-columns, and rally core supporters into an ever-tighter circle of power. When I was in Iran, at the tail end of the honeymoon period ushered in by the nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, signed in 2015), I was witness to the palpable discomfort of regime hardliners struggling to adjust to a less than zero-sum world. The last thing they wanted was western trade and investment, the empowerment of the private sector and middle class, and gradual diplomatic normalisation with the international community. Those ideological purists are much more comfortable with the intrinsic hostility to the West that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has always trumpeted.

The post-JCPOA political dispensation in Iran moved back inevitably towards this philosophy of ‘resistance’. Khamenei, who had kept an ambivalent position while allowing the negotiation of that agreement, was able to say ‘I told you so’ when the US pulled out. With Ibrahim Raisi as President from 2021, all wings of the state were in control of Iran’s hardline or ‘principalist’ faction. Having lost any real pretence of popularity in the country (Raisi won in a record-low turnout election, where any other serious candidates were excluded), they further tightened the circle of power and fell back on repression, including against the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ demonstrations of 2022.

The recent outburst of protest had a sense of inevitability about it. The catastrophic depletion of Iran’s water resources has been a slow-brewing crisis. The economic malaise that has seen the currency collapse and inflation soar over the last year has its roots as much in long-term corruption and mismanagement as in western sanctions. More to the point, the regime has absolutely no answers to these questions. The only lever that could reasonably be pulled in the short term is to negotiate away key aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief – and, in practice, that negotiation is unlikely to restart while it can be portrayed as throwing a lifeline to a wobbling regime.

There is no viable route for the regime to restore its legitimacy, short of radical change. The most important question is not whether the regime in its current form will come to an end, or when, but what comes next. The regime lost its credibility through multiple policy and governance failures, it lost its legitimacy through brutal repression, but it has yet to lose its authority. That will only happen when regime loyalists, specifically in the IRGC and Basij militia, start defecting. Until then, power continues to grow, in Mao Zedong’s words, from the barrel of a gun.

It is surprising that people outside the country seem so ready to generalise about what Iranians want. Even for those who have bravely come out on the streets, their motivations and intentions are multiple, though all coming together in fury at the regime and a demand for change. When it comes to the vast majority of the country, who are neither in the demonstrations nor regime supporters, their political aspirations are even harder to read (although, against the odds, there has been some good polling). External commentators seeking to project their wishes onto Iranian public opinion – for example, by claiming overwhelming support for Reza Pahlavi and the return of monarchy – do not help to clarify the situation. From my experience, I doubt that the majority of Iranians have lost their fears of chaos and breakdown, however much they long for an end of the current system. Even though the younger generations don’t have first-hand memories of the disappointed hopes of the 1979 revolution, they live every day with its consequences. Iranians often refer to the experience of Syrians, Libyans and other neighbouring states as salutary lessons.

They are right to be fearful of chaos. Regime replacement by revolution would require an alternative leadership that most can rally behind, and some sort of cohesive vision. Should Iran be a monarchy, a democracy, a federal state? Would it need a ‘strongman’ to hold the country together? In the absence of such conditions, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic could simply lead to a collapse of central authority and internal strife. For beleaguered Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Azeris (and other minorities), the attraction of running their own affairs would be powerful, should central authority weaken. Regional states could quickly become involved, even if only defensively, because of their concerns for their own security. Despite the governance failures of the regime, the Iranian state itself remains functional and delivers services to its people – who therefore have a lot to lose.

Iran as a failed state is a nightmare vision for its neighbours – it would export crime, terrorism, extremism and instability. For Europe, the prospect of a refugee crisis from a country over three times the population of Syria would be sobering. That is even without the nightmare scenario of nuclear technology falling into the hands of non-state actors.

That may not be enough to give pause to those from the outside pushing for ‘regime change at all costs’. US policy seems to be to stir the pot with no plan for next steps. For Israel, a collapsed Iran may not appear such a bad option. And plenty of western politicians seem to be willing to outbid each other in how hawkish they are – an easy posture to have when you have little skin in the game.

A better approach by the West might be to recognise the limits of its ability to affect Iran’s internal dynamics directly, even by means of threatened US or Israeli airstrikes. Hitting military targets such as ballistic missile or nuclear facilities, a ‘Twelve Day War 2.0’, would be irrelevant to the aims of anti-regime elements. Targeting IRGC or Basij bases would be more to the point, but very unlikely to change the balance of power on the streets. And assassinating the Supreme Leader, even if possible, would be no guarantee of a better outcome – the regime’s self-preservation instincts would remain strong.

That does not mean doing nothing to support the Iranian people, but it does mean being honest with them about the West’s ability to deliver a miracle. Giving Iranians the ability to access communications and independent Persian-language journalism has always been a key to supporting open political discourse in the country. The UK has a strong record in this area, and it is now more important than ever. Continuing to shine a spotlight on the human rights abuses committed by the regime in its crackdown, holding out the prospect of future accountability, also matters.

More controversially, the West should remain open to the prospect of change coming from within the regime. It is true that the ‘reformist’ faction have repeatedly failed to deliver meaningful change, and have lost all credibility with the people. Crowds on the streets called for an overthrow of the regime, not a reshuffling of the deckchairs. However, as the unsustainability of the current regime becomes ever clearer, politicians and generals behind closed doors have been hotly debating the future course of the Islamic Republic (echoes of this can be heard clearly in carefully crafted public statements). They will be thinking about how they can keep their wealth and personal security by delivering more radical change in social conditions and foreign policy. That may not be the Hollywood ending that many inside and outside the country would like to see, but it might lead to an acceptable near-term outcome for the people of Iran.

Crucially, this could open the door to future changes that bring real advances in human rights and democracy. For the US, Iran’s neighbours in the Persian Gulf, and the major European states, it would mean seeking pragmatic benefits rather than vengeance, and approaching the Islamic Republic with an open mind rather than being clouded by ideology. This is especially hard when we see the harrowing images coming out of the morgues in Iranian cities, showing those killed in the regime’s brutal crackdown. Still, we all need to recognise that we are not talking any more about whether change comes to Iran, but whether the state itself can hold together through that change.