President Trump has long prided himself on his political and strategic instincts, stating recently that he would know when to end the conflagration with Iran when he ‘feels it in his bones’. Yet the war has taken a turn that has drawn the United States into an escalatory trap.

Long a significant critic of significant American foreign interventions and endless nation-building wars, Trump set ‘a high bar’ for foreign intervention in his 2025 National Security Strategy, favouring instead the use of overwhelming force in targeted strikes, such as the June 2025 bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities, or the daring commando raid to snatch Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January, without long term commitments of boots on the ground. This new ‘Trump Doctrine’, which in the Venezuelan case sought ‘regime adjustment’ rather than regime change, has been found wanting in Iran. The current conflict serves as a glaring example of the fraught nature of Middle East interventions. The Islamic Republic of Iran, revolutionary and ideological in its outlook, is not merely another military junta clinging to power, but a regime prepared to preserve itself at any cost.

In the face of the developing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, Trump’s desire to end the war on his own terms appears less a reflection of reality than an effort to preserve the image of control over the campaign. Through its actions in the Strait, Iran has shifted the campaign’s centre of gravity, transforming it into a crisis of freedom of navigation, energy markets and global economic stability, while intensifying pressure on Washington. There is also reason to believe that the White House was at least partly surprised by the speed with which Hormuz became the central theatre of the confrontation. Within days, Washington’s focus shifted from strikes designed to degrade Iran to an urgent effort to reopen the world’s most sensitive shipping route. This abrupt transition suggests that the scale of the disruption, the economic costs and the need to mobilise international partners were not fully anticipated in the initial planning.

All of this comes in the wake of sharp American criticism of European countries – Britain in particular – for their hesitation to support the campaign at its outset, and for their denial of landing rights for American warplanes at their bases, prompting the president to declare that he did not need them and that the war had already been won. With rising oil prices and expanding economic pressure, Trump has intensified pressure on allies, warning that NATO faces ‘a very bad future’ if its members do not help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while issuing ambiguous statements that cast doubt on Washington’s commitment to the alliance’s collective defence clause. Yet the desire and significant efforts to secure their support underscores the limits of US power: if the outcome depended solely on Trump, there would be no need to persuade others to join the effort. The president who built his political career on the slogan ‘America First’ finds himself seeking the help of hesitant allies, operating in a theatre that refuses to bend to his will.

Another significant factor in the strategic equation is Kharg Island, Iran’s principal oil export hub. American strikes there, reportedly targeting Iranian military installations, and Trump’s signal that the island could be struck again, have further expanded the scope of the confrontation. This, together with the transfer of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on the USS Tripoli, raises the spectre of an American ground intervention. . Yet, to date, the island’s oil terminals remain operational, continuing to load Iranian crude onto supertankers, even as multinational shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains severely constrained. The result is a striking asymmetry: Iranian exports continue to flow, sustaining the regime’s most critical source of foreign currency, while the oil and gas exports of its Gulf neighbours remain largely bottlenecked.

Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure have continued unabated, targeting key sites such as Saudi Aramco facilities at Ras Tanura – its largest oil refinery, QatarEnergy’s LNG complex at Ras Laffan – responsible for roughly a fifth of global LNG supply – and the UAE’s major refining hub at Ruwais. In response, Gulf producers have moved to reroute exports away from the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has relied on the East-West Pipeline (Petroline), which runs from the Abqaiq oilfields in its Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, while the UAE has utilised the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, bypassing the Strait by transporting crude directly to the Gulf of Oman.

The Iranians have also targeted these alternative oil transit routes. Strikes on the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu and the Emirati port of Fujairah, each serving as the terminus of alternative export routes, have signalled Tehran’s intent to target not only the Strait itself, but also the infrastructure designed to circumvent it. These shifting logistics have introduced a new escalatory dynamic. Israel’s strike on Iran’s portion of the massive South Pars/North Dome gas field, which it shares with Qatar – the world’s largest – prompted a significant Iranian retaliation targeting the LNG complex at Ras Laffan, knocking out 17 per cent of Qatar’s LNG capacity for up to five years. While President Trump, under Qatari pressure, disavowed the Israeli strike in an effort to de-escalate tensions and contain the spike in oil prices, Iran has underscored its ability to achieve escalation dominance and impose a heavy cost on Washington and the Gulf states.

The Iranian move in the Strait and the decision to strike Qatar have placed Trump in a profound strategic dilemma. While the president initially threatened a significant escalation, warning he would strike Iran’s energy infrastructure if it did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours, his ultimatum has since given way to a ten-day pause in such strikes announced on 26 March, alongside the transmission of a 15-point American proposal via Pakistan, aimed at ending the conflict. Taken together, these steps could signal an effort by Washington to preserve the possibility of a negotiated settlement.

However, the backchannel negotiations may also serve as a framework for enabling a broader move, as Washington’s military buildup has continued in earnest. Should the United States escalate further – particularly through strikes to seize Kharg Island, expanded efforts to clear mines from the Strait of Hormuz, and the provision of naval escorts to international shipping – Iran could broaden its response further by intensifying missile and drone attacks on regional energy facilities, expanding disruption to maritime traffic, and potentially drawing in its Houthi allies in Yemen. All of this points to a potential new reality in which Iran is able to blackmail maritime traffic, demanding payment in exchange for safe passage and market access, with reports that Tehran is already managing behind-the-scenes negotiations with several governments to coordinate vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz.

In this sense, the battle over the Strait has evolved into the focal point of the current conflagration that will shape the next phase of the conflict and underscores Washington’s strategic dilemma. Iran does not need to defeat the United States on the battlefield. It only needs to deny it a quick victory while exacting a painful price through limited strikes and protracted economic pain. The result is that continued uncertainty, raising costs, and forcing Washington into a reality of attrition may be enough. For Trump, this represents not only a military challenge but also a political one: an open-ended confrontation that translates into higher fuel prices, market uncertainty, and a growing sense that the conflict is no longer unfolding according to a carefully managed American script.

Ultimately, the protracted nature of the campaign, combined with Iranian resolve and its ability to maintain relative regime stability, leaves Trump facing two unattractive options. He can choose to wind down the conflict, declaring a performative victory, while over time the reality may reveal that Iran has not only survived, but is also capable of rebuilding its capabilities, while still maintaining 450 kilograms of enriched uranium still in Iran—enough material for ten nuclear bombs. Alternatively, he can opt for escalation, including the deployment of ground forces in the Strait of Hormuz or action against Iran’s nuclear programme, risking a prolonged and costly entanglement that could draw the United States into precisely the kind of conflict he has sought to avoid.

Ultimately, this is Trump’s real test: not his ability to use force, but his ability to prevent it from becoming another protracted American conflict without a clear endgame. The moment is fast approaching when Trump will be forced to make a fateful determination: whether to escalate or wind down the conflict. What cannot be denied is that, in the battle over the Strait of Hormuz, he is discovering that the war will not end simply on his terms – that there are forces beyond even his control. In this respect, Trump promised he would know when to ‘feel’ the right moment to stop. He has found himself in the very trap that the late British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once described when asked what most often derails governments: ‘Events, my dear boy, events.’

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is a reminder that despite the best laid plans and the overwhelming use of force, developments on the ground frequently dictate the actions of leaders, not the other way around. Trump would be wise to heed Macmillan’s sage insight, before he, too, is consumed by events that he is unable to control.