The war in Iran has erupted in splenetic fury, producing precisely the kind of chaotic conflagration many had feared. For historians trying to assess President Trump’s prospects of success, the dashboard is blinking red, suggesting he has plunged the United States into an unwinnable war that is likely to leave Iran’s revolutionary institutions even more entrenched than before. Meanwhile, the prognosis for ordinary Iranians who were urged to ‘keep protesting’ by Trump because ‘help is on the way’ is one of only greater instability and privation.

Recent historical experience in the Middle East and elsewhere suggests that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is probably more powerful than it realises, for two reasons. The first is that Iranian institutions remain relatively cohesive, unlike those in Gaddafi’s Libya, which experienced dramatic and irreparable fragmentation during the 2011 uprising. The idea of the Islamic Republic simply imploding is therefore highly unlikely – even under the type of sustained assault it is experiencing now. The second is that, despite the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Israeli and US air power alone will not bring about regime change. While Iran’s stockpile of conventional weapons and defence systems remain vulnerable to attack, the state’s ability to deploy guerrilla tactics of the kind seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq, can persist relatively unscathed.

Consider the campaign to oust Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. After protesters in the eastern city of Benghazi were suppressed by a draconian crackdown in February 2011, the state’s institutions unravelled remarkably quickly, giving way to civil war. Barely a fortnight into the uprising, Interior Minister Abdul Fatah Younis took control of both small arms and heavy weapons, while revolutionaries overran local army barracks. Between them, they formed the National Transition Council (NTC), which communicated their demands to the outside world and provided the international community with a local interlocutor. By July, both the UK and US recognised the NTC as the country’s legitimate authority, along with 28 other countries and international bodies, including the Arab League and NATO.

Even before the NTC was officially recognised, its mere presence provided NATO with a partner it could support. When ‘Operation Unified Protector’ was launched in March 2011, authorised by a UN mandate to protect the Libyan people, NATO forces coordinated their efforts closely with the NTC, which included the provision of both intelligence and reconnaissance, and air cover for forces on the ground. This strategy was so effective that aerial assistance is credited with paving the way for rebels to enter Tripoli in August 2011 and, ultimately, with the capture of Gaddafi himself, who was summarily executed by rebels in Sirte.

Yet the very factors that condemned Gaddafi to failure were also the ones that inhibited his opponents from realising their goals. The lack of any meaningful political institutions in Libya – control was instead organised around Gaddafi personally, rather than vested in a bureaucracy – ensured that, after his ousting, the state collapsed almost immediately. Power devolved instead into the hands of local militias, who jockeyed to control the most important commodities in the ensuing vacuum: men, money and munitions.

The Libyan state has never recovered. It remains fractured along regional lines with a so-called Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli, which is unable to exert authority over its own legislative body, the House of Representatives, based in the east, which refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of the GNU. Instead, the House of Representatives derives its authority from Khalifa Haftar, a former regime insider who rose up the ranks to become Gaddafi’s Chief of Staff before turning on him and fleeing overseas. Having returned to Libya during the revolution, he now leads the Libyan National Army and autonomously rules the eastern provinces. The country’s political framework remains so volatile that Gaddafi’s son, the one-time heir apparent, Saif al-Islam, was killed at home last month by four assassins.

A similar outcome is unlikely in Iran. National forces have been indoctrinated in the ideas of the 1979 revolution for almost half a century. Although belief in its core mission may have waned among some constituents, the Revolutionary Guards are simply too invested in the state’s survival to easily succumb to fratricide. By some estimates, the IRGC accounts for around half of the Iranian economy, an entanglement which has grown as a direct result of the late Ali Khamenei’s growing reliance on it. As the effects of sanctions took hold, the IRGC curated lucrative smuggling networks for oil, drugs and tobacco to generate rents. It also became instrumental to the maintenance of critical domestic industries affected by sanctions, such as oil and gas, construction, telecommunications and mining.

Moreover, ever since the emergence of a massive protest movement in 2009 to contest the outcome of presidential elections, Ali Khamenei grew increasingly reliant on the IRGC to maintain both social and political order. The symbiosis between the two grew exponentially, as they sought to further entrench the regime both at home and abroad. Until the 7 October attacks in 2023, they could have considered themselves very successful. Hezbollah had always operated as an arm of Iranian intelligence, but they were now also controlling Syria as a client state and had developed an extensive network of armed militias across Iraq in the aftermath of the challenge from ISIS. The IRGC also grew more audacious in its ambitions, running sophisticated cross-border operations to kidnap Iranian dissidents based abroad. Two activists in Europe were separately lured to Turkey and Iraq before being taken to Tehran. In another case, an Iranian living in the United States was intercepted while transiting through the United Arab Emirates and smuggled to Oman before being taken to Iran by sea. All three were executed. Western countries have also alleged other cases of malevolent Iranian-backed activities on their shores for years, including a plot to assassinate Trump.

In this respect, Iran has already spent years moving day-to-day power away from its revolutionary ideological vanguard, embodied by the Ayatollahs, towards the praetorian elements of the state led by the Revolutionary Guards. Signs of that shift became apparent following a statement by President Masoud Pezeshkian, when he apologised to the Arab Gulf states for targeting them. He offered to halt such attacks if they ensured that US bases located there were not used to launch further attacks against Iranian targets. His statement came days after Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the army had become ‘independent and somewhat isolated’ following the outbreak of hostilities. The IRGC appears unmoved by these calls for conciliation. As Pezeshkian’s address aired on TV fresh attacks were almost simultaneously targeting Dubai airport. Hours later, Raja News, a hardline outlet aligned with the IRGC, published an editorial slamming the president for undermining morale and projecting weakness. ‘Take the microphone away from Pezeshkian,’ it declared.

Veteran Iran analyst Karim Sadjadpour points out that the security apparatus represents the true deep state, while technocrats offered up to western media – like President Pezeshkian – are often powerless figureheads whose primary job is to deflect attention from those who really wield power. Most analysts considered Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who was assassinated on 17 March, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Parliament, to be two of the most important individuals supporting the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. Both have backgrounds in the IRGC.

A fracturing of the state’s power base is made even more unlikely by overtures from one of the world’s most powerful Shia clerics, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Originally born in Iran, he has lived in Iraq’s holy city of Najaf for more than 70 years and has maintained his distance from Iran’s political project, including its goal of expanding Tehran’s sphere of influence into Iraq. The assassination of Ali Khamenei, however, stirred him into action. ‘The great nation of this land is expected, under these difficult and sensitive circumstances, to preserve unity and national cohesion,’ he said.

This is what distinguishes the military dynamics in Iran so markedly from what occurred in Libya. Under Gaddafi’s jamahiriya system, the state was directly supported by oil rents, allowing him to avoid investing power in any institution beyond himself or his family. Security was instead derived through personal networks of power and patronage, which not only prompted the dramatic unravelling of the Libyan state in 2011, but which also fuelled the dynamics that have undermined its unity ever since. Highly localised militias now prioritise the capture of oilfields and control of smuggling routes to maintain microeconomies tied to their own militias, undercutting the authority of its fledgling institutions.

Both the United States and Israel should welcome the fact Iran is unlikely to implode. When the same happened in Iraq after the Coalition invasion of 2003, displaced Sunnis from Saddam Hussein’s former administration reconstituted themselves in different ways. First, they supported the insurgency against the occupying Coalition forces by supplying the insurgents with arms, which, in part, sucked the United States into a bloody quagmire for years. Second, once Iraq had passed through the most acute phases of the war, they assumed senior leadership positions within ISIS, transforming it into a highly effective bureaucracy and intelligence organisation. This allowed it to leapfrog al-Qaeda as the world’s most deadly and brazen terror organisation.

Although ISIS housed a seemingly unlikely union of radical jihadists and onetime Baathists, the alliance suited both parties by aligning their mutual aims: waging a revanchist campaign of Sunni chauvinism across Syria and Iraq, while simultaneously targeting American interests in the region. The same is to be expected of the IRGC, whose interest in maintaining the status quo is too entrenched to be simply washed away overnight. There won’t be an Iranian equivalent of de-Baathification, but if the IRGC’s grip on control is weakened, it can be expected to lash out even more unpredictably than it already has.

Amid this background, Trump’s call for Iranians to take matters into their own hands is misplaced. A mass movement can hardly assert itself on the streets while an active bombing campaign persists. That much was confirmed in a statement from CENTCOM to the Iranian people, which warned: ‘US forces strongly urge civilians in Iran to stay at home.’ Even if protesters were to reappear, the state retains its monopoly on violence and has demonstrated its willingness to crush dissent. Indeed, Salar Abnoush, deputy commander of the IRGC’s paramilitary Basij forces, has already warned of deadly recriminations. ‘Parents, if your son or daughter will not listen, that is not our fault. Anyone in Iran today who raises their voice and speaks in harmony with the enemy’ is fair game, he said, warning that ‘a shoot-on-sight order has been issued for them’.

What all this demonstrates is that the Iranian establishment, and the IRGC in particular, retain more power than Trump realises. Yes, they are on the backfoot and suffering heavy losses on the battlefield, but this does not tell the whole story. Two important factors have also become apparent about the IRGC’s durability. The first relates to its contingency plans, which allow for continuity even in the event of an overwhelming attack. That is precisely what transpired in the aftermath of Khamenei’s assassination. The second relates to its ability to deploy asymmetric means in support of its war effort. In this respect, the use of Shahed drones has proved particularly effective against the Gulf States. They are relatively cheap to produce (costing anywhere between $20,000-$50,000), while a single Patriot missile fired in response costs up to $3 million. They are also easy to launch and can be deployed from the back of flatbed trucks or shipping containers, meaning they are harder to disrupt because conventional methods of cratering aircraft runways are irrelevant. This ease of deployment also means they can be launched in ‘swarms’, operating at scale in the hopes of overwhelming conventional air-defence systems.

It is a tactic that previously paid dividends for both the Taliban and Iraqi insurgencies, both of which slowly chipped away at American forces through years of gruelling, attritional combat. This has been closely studied by the IRGC, whose leaders were still young men during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, an era of conventional war with heavy weapons. However, it was during the War on Terror’s years of dogged asymmetrical campaigns that they came of age, learning how to bludgeon technologically superior foes through stubborn determination. Jason Shell, a former Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer, explained how the US army was routinely flummoxed by ‘a $265 device [that] can disable a $525,000 armoured vehicle’. He continued:

Whether you measure in blood or treasure, the IED also proved the costliest feature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for American forces. 60 per cent of all American fatalities in Iraq and half of all American fatalities in Afghanistan, more than 3,500 in total, were caused by IEDs. The same proportion holds for Americans who were wounded, totalling more than 30,000 service members. When history looks back on these wars, the dominant images will be of the aftermath of these improvised bombs, of their devastating effects on a Baghdad market or of veteran and Afghan amputees.

Similar tactics were also deployed by al-Qaeda, which aimed to damage the aviation industry through repeated targeting. They reasoned that, even if their plots were unsuccessful, the resulting security cost would represent an economic victory of sorts. When the group sent exploding printer cartridges from Yemen to Chicago in 2010 using cargo planes, the plan was ultimately thwarted by a tip-off from Saudi intelligence and the devices were intercepted while transiting through East Midlands airport. In response, the group boasted that the operation had barely cost them $4,200 while the resulting response and ongoing countermeasures had imposed exorbitant costs in the millions.

Iran is deploying the same strategy now as it seeks to hold the global economy hostage, and, in the process, damage the reputation of both President Trump and the United States. The corollary is clear: war on Iran will result in further global disorder, increased commodity and food prices, heightened inflationary pressures, and interest rate spikes, all stemming from a war of whimsy. For a president arguably even more sensitive to market signals than most, this will hurt, particularly as the US midterms approach.

The fallout won’t be limited to the United States. East Asian markets are particularly reliant on oil from the Strait of Hormuz, although the effects of price shocks and disruption will cascade through global supply chains. Europeans can also expect to pay more for energy, holidays and tracker mortgages as the war persists. In the UK, the BBC suggests that ‘a typical mortgage taken out now is £788 a year more expensive than before the Iran war began’. It comes as another blow to European leaders who are already considering the integrity of American alliances and who will feel they have been recklessly exposed to macroeconomic headwinds. To counteract these pressures, Trump has eased sanctions on Russian oil, much to the dismay of European leaders, who believe it will prolong the war in Ukraine by providing a much-needed injection of funds into the Russian economy. Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron and Volodymyr Zelensky have all denounced the decision.

Gulf countries are feeling similar fatigue and have demonstrated their willingness to look beyond the United States when needed. China helped Saudi Arabia broker a rapprochement with Tehran in March 2023, ending a seven-year suspension of diplomatic relations. Notably, the deal also revived a security cooperation agreement, originally signed in 2001, which aimed at combatting drug trafficking, crime and terrorism. Riyadh has also worked with Beijing on energy deals, signing a $5.6 billion deal with Human Horizons, an electric vehicle manufacturer, alongside other initiatives aligning the Kingdom’s Vision 2030 with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Riyadh has also resisted joining western sanctions on Russia and continues to coordinate global oil prices with Putin through OPEC+ instruments.

More than its neighbours, the UAE is bearing the brunt of Iran’s asymmetrical campaign, perhaps because it has been the most visible partner in the Abraham Accords. Whatever the reason, one of its strongest emblems, Emirates airlines, is suffering a series of systemic challenges beyond cancellations. Flight paths are also having to be rerouted, adding additional delays and costs associated with increased fuel burn. For an airline that has based its commercial model on operating as a transit hub, added flight times also throws the delicate sequencing of connecting flights on popular routes into disarray. These shocks can be absorbed for now, but a protracted conflict will present significant problems. Similar to Riyadh, the UAE has demonstrated its willingness to break with Washington in pursuit of its political interests. It has continued to arm the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan despite intense pressure not to do so. It also re-engaged diplomatically with Syria’s President Assad in 2018 after the United States counselled against it, and has worked with Saudi Arabia through OPEC+ to manage international oil markets in conjunction with Vladimir Putin.

This leaves Trump with just two options, neither of which is desirable. The first is to seek a quick off-ramp with the aim of assuaging international markets, relieving inflationary pressures and soothing America’s frayed international alliances. This will only embolden the IRGC, who will regard their strategy of ‘forward defence’ as having paid dividends, fending off a ferocious joint assault from both the United States and Israel. All of its essential institutions will remain, and the revolutionary project of the Islamic Republic will stay intact. It will set about restoring the status quo as quickly as it can, emerging even more emboldened than before. Both Trump and Netanyahu have said such an outcome is unacceptable.

The alternative, then, is to impose similar costs on Iran while accepting the limits of what is actually attainable. That is the lesson of the 9/11 wars waged against global jihadist groups. They have not been dismantled, nor has their cause disappeared. In many cases, they have simply redirected their attention. Yes, the Taliban are back in power in Afghanistan, but they no longer pursue – or allow others to pursue – a global agenda from within their borders. Meanwhile, they have implemented a series of misogynistic rules preventing girls from pursuing an education and have barred women from the workplace. They have realised that it is more sustainable to pursue the pragmatic path of abandoning the cause of international jihad against the West, and instead focusing on controlling, and transforming, their own society.

Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria realised this, too, long before marching into the People’s Palace in Damascus. While confined to his rump proto-state in Idlib, al-Sharaa saw how his erstwhile comrade, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, provoked western powers into precipitating his demise. He adopted the opposite approach and ensured his territory wasn’t used as a launchpad for external operations. It paid dividends. This recalibration of the global movement, however, was only produced after more than two decades of war.

Iran’s escalation trap has ensnared the United States in a labyrinthine web of undesirable choices, luring President Trump into an unwinnable war. In the process, it diminishes America’s global standing by straining its alliances through diplomatic and economic pressures. Whatever course of action President Trump ultimately decides upon – a swift departure or protracted war – the outlook for ordinary Iranians hoping to rid themselves of this extremist experiment are bleak. The historical record suggests the IRGC will emerge intact, in one form or another, and be more defiant, dedicated and demanding than ever before.