The launch of operation ‘Epic Fury’ on the morning of 28 February has been greeted with a mixture of anxiety, apprehension and, among the Iranian opposition at least, exultation. The latest round of negotiations between Iran and the United States, held on 26 February, was declared by the Iranians and Omanis alike to have been positive and there was some suggestion that ‘technical talks’ would proceed on Monday. For some, the mood suddenly appeared upbeat, even if there was scant endorsement for such a view from the Americans. The air of manufactured optimism was shattered by President Trump the following day, when he expressed himself dissatisfied with the Iranian offer, limited as it was to the nuclear file. For Trump and his administration, any agreement had to include a wider range of concessions, on missiles, support for proxies and, more vaguely, the Islamic Republic’s treatment of its own people.

Commentators were dismissive of this last point, but it probably had a greater impact and influence on Trump’s decision to act than many appreciate. Certainly, without the unprecedented slaughter of Iranians by the regime last January, the moral imperative would have been absent. What most people have missed in the diplomatic exchanges of the last few months has been the wider politics, as well as the deeper sense of malaise, fatigue and frustration, that has affected most of the western policy establishment, including the United States. As both Trump, and subsequently Ambassador Michael Waltz at the United Nations amplified, this is less about particulars, and more about a wider antipathy that the Islamic Republic has done little to bridge throughout its existence.

To paraphrase Trump, it’s about 47 years of accumulated pain. Over the last year, the Islamic Republic – much weakened by its encounter with Israel – has found itself confronted by a United States with a grievance to match its own and with a growing political will to do something about it. Moreover, in Trump the regime’s leaders were disturbed to find someone with about as much respect for the international rules-based order as they had. For Iran’s people, who have been at the sharp end of the Islamic Republic’s disdain for rules and rights of any nature, Trump’s approach seemed refreshing. This is why, to the apparent bewilderment of some overseas commentators, many Iranians in Iran were thrilled by the American attack and openly expressed their ‘love’ for the US president.

It is difficult to know how this will end. No conflict ever develops as we expect. But despite the fog of war that now hinders our ability to see clearly on the ground – the internet has naturally been cut, though many people now have access to Starlink – we can be sure that just as no plan survives contact with the enemy, no preconception survives experience. Expect many assumptions to be overturned in the coming weeks and months. There are nonetheless a few things we can, with relative confidence conclude, even at this early stage in the conflict.

The rhetorical flourish of the Islamic Republic far outpaces its ability to do anything. Far from learning important lessons from the 12-Day War, its airspace was still compromised and its security fabric deeply penetrated. The decapitation of the IRGC leadership that occurred last time was not only repeated but extended to the political leadership, right up to and including the Supreme Leader and his family. Even more astonishing is the fact that photos of the deceased Ali Khamenei were somehow immediately conveyed to the Israelis. Whatever Iran’s security forces were doing since last June, rooting out Mossad agents was not one of them.

The Iranian response has been more eclectic and random than most imagined, targeting almost every country in the region – including Oman – and overturning any modest achievements they have had in building diplomatic relations with their near neighbours. Moreover, far from being precise, the Iranian counter-strikes appear to be targeting residential buildings and hotels, and, in one case, reportedly hit one of their own ‘shadow’ oil tankers in the Persian Gulf.

Most of these missiles and drones have been intercepted, so the damage is comparatively slight, but the intention – to let the region burn – has enraged Arab neighbours. And despite apologetic protestations to ‘our Muslim brothers’ from the Iranian foreign minister, it is entirely possible that these Arab states may join in the fight against the Islamic Republic, towards whom they have just as much frustration, exhaustion and exasperation as anyone in the West.

How things might unfold further down the line depends on three factors: the effectiveness of the US-Israeli attacks and their ability to sustain air supremacy in the medium to long term over Iran, degrading Iranian capabilities, including the repressive apparatus, and maintaining watch over them; the ability of the Islamic Republic to project pain on the wider region, disrupting the regional economy, while retaining control of a coherent repressive apparatus at home; and, finally, perhaps the most important factor as far as Trump’s wider stated ambition of ‘regime change’ is concerned, is the ability of the domestic opposition to cohere and take to the streets. It is this factor above all else that will dictate the pace of change.

As Hannah Arendt argued: ‘In the contest of violence against violence the superiority of the government has always been absolute, but this superiority lasts only as long as the power structure of the government is intact’ – and where, to be blunt, it retains a monopoly on violence. Operation ‘Epic Fury’ is in the process of removing that monopoly, and, as Arendt pointedly noted, once that has happened, ‘the situation changes abruptly’.