The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in a joint US-Israeli airstrike on 28 February 2026, plunged the Islamic Republic of Iran into its most profound leadership crisis and potential regime-shaking transition since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989. Within hours, Tehran activated the constitutional mechanism designed for precisely such a contingency: the formation of a three-member interim leadership council empowered to exercise the Supreme Leader’s authority until a successor is chosen.

At the centre of this provisional structure stands Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, appointed as the jurist member of the council alongside President Masoud Pezeshkian and Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i. Under Article 111 of the Constitution, this body assumes the core responsibilities of the Supreme Leader when the office becomes vacant. In principle, the Assembly of Experts must convene promptly to elect a new leader. In practice, however, Iran is at war. Senior political figures have indicated that the assembly will not hold its decisive session until hostilities subside. Until then, the interim leadership council will not simply fill a temporary vacuum. It will function as Iran’s formal supreme authority.

This moment matters not only because of who sits on the council, but also because of what the council is designed to do. The interim body inherits most of the Supreme Leader’s powers: oversight of the armed forces, direction of general state policy, supervision of the judiciary, and final arbitration among major institutions. It also exercises authority over critical decisions, including the appointment of senior military commanders and strategic wartime directives. The concentration of authority in a small and cohesive group may accelerate decision-making at a time when the regime seeks unity and speed.

Arafi’s appointment is especially significant. He is not a peripheral cleric elevated by circumstance. He has long operated within the core ideological institutions of the Islamic Republic. As the head of Iran’s Seminary and a member of the Guardian Council, he represents the clerical establishment’s supervisory machinery. His institutional trajectory places him at the intersection of theology, education and political oversight. Observers have consistently associated him with hardline currents inside the regime, particularly those that emphasise ideological consolidation and resistance to western influence.

His earlier leadership roles within the seminary network, including positions connected to international religious education structures, have drawn attention abroad. In 2020, the United States sanctioned Al Mustafa International University, alleging that it facilitated recruitment for networks associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. While such allegations do not automatically imply personal operational command, they reinforce the perception that Arafi has operated within an ecosystem closely intertwined with Iran’s external ideological and paramilitary outreach. His presence on the interim council signals continuity with that Khomeinist worldview rather than a shift toward moderation.

Arafi has also played a role in imposing restrictive and anti-western educational, cultural and social prohibitions on Iranians as a member of the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution. This has been part of Khamenei’s quest to guard against western infiltration. Arafi himself, however, has travelled to Europe in the past, including to Germany.

Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i is another potential contender for the supreme leadership. He brings a different skillset than Arafi. He is known for his brutality and bloodstained record, once biting a reporter and bragging about it in his state biography. Executions have reached record highs during his tenure at the helm of the judiciary.

Before becoming chief justice, Mohseni-Eje’i was intelligence minister, attorney general and first deputy chief justice. This positions him at the heart of the military-security apparatus. Unlike Arafi, Mohseni-Eje’i has held a seat on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for years, first as intelligence minister and then chief justice. This has exposed him to sensitive foreign policy and security decision-making in a way that is different from Arafi, who brings a more academic and religious perspective.

The political significance of this interim council should be understood in the context of succession. Under normal circumstances, the Assembly of Experts would deliberate and vote on a new Supreme Leader soon after a vacancy. War has altered this timeline. With active hostilities and heightened security risks, convening the assembly poses substantial dangers. A single missile attack could target a gathering of senior clerics and eliminate much of the body at once. By postponing its decisive session until the war ends, the political system effectively extends the interim council’s lifespan and influence.

This delay reshapes the internal balance of power. Instead of a swift clerical selection process conducted behind closed doors, Iran now faces a potentially prolonged period in which executive, judicial and clerical authority are fused within a wartime triumvirate. Decisions taken during this phase will shape not only military strategy but also the configuration of the post-Khamenei order. The council will oversee appointments, manage crises and define the tone of the state’s response. It will also influence the political environment in which the Assembly of Experts eventually votes. Emergency conditions often justify stricter security measures, tighter media control and further centralisation of authority.

There is an additional dimension. Wartime governance tends to strengthen security institutions. Even if the council is constitutionally temporary, its reliance on the armed forces and security apparatus for national survival deepens the influence of those actors. If the interim period extends for months, the security elite’s role in stabilising the state will expand, and its leverage in the succession process will grow accordingly. Such a dynamic may favour candidates aligned with the clergy-military nexus rather than those associated with technocratic pragmatism.

During the immediate crisis, the interim leadership council is likely to present a united front. Visible fissures would signal vulnerability during an external confrontation. Once the situation stabilises, the Assembly of Experts can convene and elect a new leader. For now, however, the war postpones the assembly’s decisive role. Iran is governed by three men whose authority derives from constitutional contingency rather than electoral renewal or revolutionary upheaval.

If the regime endures, Mohseni-Eje’i and Arafi could emerge as plausible contenders for the position of Supreme Leader. Both are widely viewed as hardliners who follow Khamenei’s political and ideological trajectory. But they both have weaknesses in their candidacies. Mohseni-Eje’i and Arafi are not Sayyids, or direct descendants from the Prophet Muhammad. This stands in contrast to both Khomeini and Khamenei, who were. While this is not a constitutional requirement to become Supreme Leader, some Assembly of Experts members may raise such questions. Arafi’s lack of foreign policy and security experience could present a stumbling block, as could the fact that he has never led a branch of government, with some questioning his administrative experience. Khamenei himself was president before becoming Supreme Leader. There are other candidates to choose from, but with both men now so prominently managing state affairs on this council, the spotlight will turn on them. They will have more stature on the council than Pezeshkian, who has been a weak president and has never been a member of the regime’s inner religious and military sanctum.

The longer this interim phase continues, the more it will shape the Iran that emerges after both the war and Khamenei. In that sense, the interim council is not merely a bridge between two leaders. It is an arena in which the future architecture of power is being defined under the pressures of war.