Over the skyline of Jerusalem, the holiest city for three of the world’s faiths, the howling of air-raid sirens is an eerie indication of inbound missiles. In Tehran, columns of thick grey smoke rose up from a government building, hit by a US or Israeli airstrike.

In a joint operation, the United States and Israel carried out extensive airstrikes across Iran on 28 February, and the Iranians retaliated immediately with their own attacks across the region. The casus belli, Washington claimed, was the exhaustion of the talks in Vienna that were supposed to neutralise any chance of Iran resuming its nuclear programme. This followed a period of diplomacy that had lasted since the American and Israeli interdiction of Iran’s nuclear facilities in the so-called ‘12-Day War’. Global opinion was in favour of some form of action because of the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown against massive civil protests, which combined frustration with rising prices, water shortages and long-standing corrupt and brutal repression. The death toll inflicted by Tehran’s loyalists is unknown, but speculative reports put the figure in the tens of thousands.

The co-ordinated American airstrikes targeted ballistic missile installations and air defences in Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj and Kermanshah, as well as other military sites around the country. At the time of writing, it was too early to tell how effective the strikes had been. Iran, of course, has a track record of denial, and despite its attempts to sow doubt, it is clear that the strikes in 2025 against its nuclear facilities were far more effective than initially assumed.

Tehran retaliated against American bases in Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain. Missiles were also reported to have landed in Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait City and Riyadh. Significantly, Iran also launched missiles against Israel, where an American carrier and local air-defence systems intercepted the incoming attack. Iran threatened a ‘crushing response’, but its actions rarely live up to its rhetoric. In the run up to the latest round of US-Israeli strikes, the regime of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was as anxious about renewed civil unrest as it was by the air attacks.

In the short term, the fallout from the attacks remains within the region. Airspace has been closed to all but military aircraft, and the reporting has been focused on damage and casualties. Iran’s decision to immediately widen the conflict by attacking American installations, Israel and the Gulf states indicated that it was willing to escalate and attempt to inflict as much destruction as it could manage before it lost its capability to do so under American attack. The US has sufficient air power in the region, including aboard its fleet in the Arabian Sea, to sustain a longer air campaign. The Americans may, over coming days and weeks, decide to progressively wear down Iran’s air defences and early warning systems, as well as its ballistic missile and drone capabilities. It may even seek to facilitate local resistance.

Economically, regional states and high-consuming nations in Europe, India and China will be concerned if the conflict becomes prolonged. Russia may profit from higher oil prices in the short term. This would be paradoxical because America acted decisively against the Venezuelan regime in January 2026, and, at a stroke, deprived its chief rivals, Russia and China, of a key source of energy. At the time, this was widely interpreted as an American move against a regime that was hostile to the United States, and the economic-strategic dimension was, to some extent, overlooked. Equally, in the case of Iran, the dominant interpretation will be that the US has moved against a dictatorship that seeks a nuclear arsenal directly threatening America and its allies. Nevertheless, if the Iranian regime is overthrown, Russia and China would lose a key partner and the world’s largest exporters of hydrocarbons would be secure to conduct commerce free of the threat of Iranian attack. In other words, there is a deeper strategic purpose here.

After the failure of the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement that limited Iran’s nuclear programme, the United States had asserted ‘maximum pressure’ on the Iranians through sanctions, whose long-term effects created the conditions for civil unrest. It also convinced some elements of the regime in Tehran that they must acquire military partners and nuclear capabilities. Russia, a consumer of Iranian Shahed drones – which it has used extensively against Ukraine – was in a position to act as a military partner and perhaps even facilitate Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.

What made this even more serious was the willingness of the Iranian regime to sponsor, facilitate, arm and direct violent paramilitary forces across the Middle East. The Houthi regime in Yemen received extensive support from Iran and proved to be a menace to international shipping in the Red Sea, one of the busiest sea lanes of the world. Iran’s protégé Hezbollah was not only a thorn in the side of Israel, but was instrumental in the domination of Syria and interference in the politics of Lebanon. Furthermore, Iran was one of the most significant supporters of Hamas. But Tehran has been a sponsor of terrorism for years, and has acted ruthlessly against those it considers its enemies. Some will be hoping that this is the final denouement of the ‘Islamic Revolution’.

The impression one has is that the Iranian regime is akin to the historic Assassins of the medieval era, almost universally despised for their underhand, destabilising unconventional warfare. Nevertheless, there will be the usual protests by the far left and by Islamists against America. Their romantic, misguided passion for supporting revolutionaries will mean that they will condemn America’s actions and align themselves against the victims of Iranian repression. They will ignore the fact that thousands of young women in Iran have been beaten and sometimes killed for their protests, including those against compulsory headscarves. They will also ignore the hundreds and thousands of students, working people and families who have opposed the regime that has denied them a voice or the dignity of a democratic life.

If the Iranian regime survives, it will try to resume its campaigns of murder and its support of violent paramilitaries across the Middle East, particularly against American personnel and bases. In Iraq, for example, Tehran enabled so-called Popular Mobilisation Forces and encouraged them to make attacks on the US and anyone else who opposed their control. The prospects are that Iran will continue to sponsor terrorism.

This prompts the question of whether America and Israel will have done enough to either stop a nuclear programme or to enable the Iranian people to take control of their own country. It also calls into question whether the method of air attack is the one that will achieve America’s strategic objectives or not. It is possible that, over time, the US and Israel could do sufficient damage to prevent the development of a nuclear programme for a few years. But a long-term solution would require the participation of Iranians. If the Iranian people fully withdraw their consent to be governed by the ayatollahs, by means of a general strike and passive resistance, then there is the possibility that the government of Tehran will fall.

Most will anticipate a short American and Israeli intervention, but this is just part of a long conflict that is set to continue until the ayatollahs finally lose their grip on power.