As Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu’s war on Iran approaches its third week, a clear objective remains elusive. The fog of war appears to have produced many mirages amid the rubble and smoke. Between insisting that protecting the US from imminent threats was paramount, foreshadowing the removal of the cleric-led political order and encouraging the Iranian population to rise up against the regime, Trump last week alighted on the Iranian Kurds as a wild card that might be introduced into the theatre of conflict. Given the effective role that Syrian Kurdish organisations played in the campaign against ISIS, and the reputation of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Northern Iraq as reliable allies of the West, the Kurds in Iran may appear to be tailor-made partners for a ground campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Yet, in the cold light of day, the White House’s proposed Kurdish gambit adds weight to the notion that it is making things up as it goes along. Exactly how Kurdish militias might be deployed is unclear. The very suggestion demonstrates a lack of understanding of the dynamics of Kurdish politics, as well as Iran’s demographic make-up and knotty internal political landscape, not to mention wider geopolitical concerns.

Talk of a Kurdish offensive in Iran arose after reports that Trump had been in contact with Kurdish officials and that he would back those within Iran taking up arms against the regime. As reports were circulating that the CIA were arming Kurdish groups in northern Iraq, Trump remarked in an interview that a Kurdish-led ground campaign against Tehran would be ‘wonderful’. Proposing the Kurds as a ready-made strike force to take on the Iranian military in this way appears to rest on the assumption that ‘the Kurds’ are a unified, homogenous population, willing and able to do America’s bidding. This is wrong on several levels. Kurdish societies and political organisations, like those of any population, are diverse in outlook, inclination and political aspiration. The realm of Kurdish politics is notoriously fragmented, a veritable alphabet soup of groups with competing agendas, perspectives and support bases.

This general diversity is compounded by the fact that Kurdish populations are divided among Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, each community adapting to and being shaped by local political dynamics and the constraints placed upon them by those states. Kurds maintain a strong sense of solidarity, and support networks, across borders, but there is no Kurdish political consensus or standing army that can be immediately swung into action in any theatre at the behest of the White House. To suggest such a possibility highlights a poor understanding of Middle Eastern geography aside from anything else.

Initial reports proposed that Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq would make the opening foray, advancing from Iran’s western border. Some suggested a campaign was already under way. Whether these were just more White House thought bubbles, or attempts to cajole Kurds by weight of expectation into taking action, Kurdish responses were less than wholeheartedly positive. Iranian Kurdish groups immediately denied any offensive had begun and President Nechirvan Barzani of the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq clearly stated that his government would be not a party to the conflict. Meanwhile, Shanaz Ibrahim Ahmed, Iraq’s first lady, herself Kurdish, declared that the Iraqi people, Kurds included, had no desire to be dragged into ‘another round of destruction’.

Rumours of a prospective Kurdish offensive were spurred by US and Israeli air strikes on military and security installations in Iran’s western, Kurdish-majority provinces. The coming together in late February of five Iranian-Kurdish parties to form an alliance also lent credence to suggestions of a Kurdish military initiative. In a statement, the alliance stressed that it was responding to the shifting political terrain following sustained anti-regime protests across Iran, declaring that the Islamic Republic had ‘no political legitimacy left’. But when Iranian forces, in turn, conducted strikes on Kurdish targets, the alliance warned ‘all communities throughout Iranian Kurdistan to exercise immediate caution’. As one Kurdish observer told me, this sounds more like an admonition to ‘keep your head down’ than a call to arms.

There are historical precedents for Kurdish uprisings during times of turbulence in Iran. In 1946, the Kurds established a short-lived autonomous administration, the Mahabad Republic, with Soviet support, while in the upheaval of the Shah’s ousting and the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Kurdish forces rebelled and for a time controlled territory in the western provinces until overcome by the Revolutionary Guard. It is clear that Kurds are chafing under the strictures of the Islamic regime, as many groups are. Yet these earlier episodes provide cautionary lessons, both because Tehran eventually exacted brutal revenge and because a Kurdish political entity enjoys little support or sympathy from the wider Iranian community. Indeed, it may even be the case that the spectre of Kurdish separatism helped to rally Iran’s majority Persian population around Khomeini and his newly installed Islamic regime after 1979.

Such sentiments remain potent. Even while Iranians are caught between the iron-fist of the ayatollahs and escalating destruction caused by American and Israeli air-strikes, the prospect of armed Kurdish forces advancing within Iran will be disquieting for many. Iranian-Kurdish groups tend to call for rights within a federated Iran or greater freedoms for the Iranian people as a whole, rather than outright national independence. However, there is a propensity among the Persian majority to view Kurdish groups and political aspirations as universally ‘separatist’. Thus, even if Kurdish fighters were able to roll back the regime it is unlikely that they would be viewed positively by many Iranians.

Any misgivings in Iran at Kurdish territorial or political gains would be mirrored across the border in Turkey. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan has understandably commented on security concerns arising from the conflict in Iran, stating that Turkey would show ‘no hesitation’ in responding to threats. It is not unreasonable to assume that one such threat that Ankara perceives would be the recalibration of Iran’s political terrain to favour Kurdish political or military organisations. During the Syrian civil war Turkish forces repeatedly crossed the border, and sometimes remained in place for extended periods, principally to curb the Kurdish-led autonomous territory known as Rojava. Ankara will be pleased at the recent collapse of the Rojava project and would not welcome something similar arising in Iran. A Turkish pundit recently observed that Ankara had no desire to become embroiled in the conflict, but any advance in Iran of militia associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party would spur an abrupt change in attitude.

It is likely that the recent experience of Rojava is uppermost in the minds of Iranian Kurds now. Although Kurdish-led Syrian forces won international plaudits and military support while fighting ISIS, that support was withdrawn abruptly once priorities in the White House shifted. This is an oft-repeated pattern. In 2017, after Kurdish peshmerga had played a key role in the liberation of Mosul, Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq took a step towards self-determination, organising an independence referendum, a generally free and fair democratic mechanism that theoretically should have pleased western policymakers. But western capitals criticised the move as destabilising and turned a blind eye while, unlikely as it sounds, Iraq, Iran and Turkey ganged up to menace the Kurdistan region. As a consequence, Iranian Kurdish groups will be alert to the fickle nature of international patronage and the flimsiness of American security guarantees. It is true that western support and lobbying have seen Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq improve their respective political positions, but external sponsorship has a habit of drying up at inopportune moments. All of this, no doubt, makes Iranian Kurds reluctant to take up arms against Tehran at Trump’s insistence.

Someone affiliated with the Kurdish political movement in Turkey once told me that Kurds have learned not to respond to provocations but to steadily pursue their political goals. Whether that is true is debatable, but it is to be hoped that Kurdish political leaders, in Iran and elsewhere, have learned that strategic and tactical offers and inducements should be viewed critically and accepted only with the utmost caution. Iranian Kurds may be tempted by opportunities for rapid gains during the current upheaval, but they must recognise that they cannot singlehandedly resolve the complex problems that beset Iran, and missteps will bring unforeseeable repercussions. Kurds may be able to play a role in changing Iran for the better, but the torments of modern Iran will only be relieved if the diverse peoples of Iran forge in concert a coherent, inclusive political model that provides security and a voice for all.