How America’s allies can preserve the West

Given the recent drama in Westminster, one could be forgiven for overlooking the news that Poland and the United Kingdom recently signed a major security agreement. Under the Northolt Treaty, the two parties have pledged to further deepen their co-operation, going beyond their existing mutual defence commitments under NATO. The arrangement also identifies Russia as the most significant long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and commits to joint development of new military capabilities, including a next-generation missile system.

The UK-Poland treaty is emblematic of an emerging pattern of behaviour among America’s closest allies. They are stepping up to underwrite regional security at a time when doubts deepen about Washington’s reliability. For British strategists, the somewhat icy relationship between Downing Street and the White House is a matter of grave concern. The disputes over tariffs and basing are troubling, but of greater significance have been President Trump’s threats to annex Greenland and his seeming endorsement of Russia’s territorial claims in Ukraine. Both mark an implicit acceptance that ‘might makes right’, a notion fundamentally at odds with the traditional principles of the US-led (and, by extension, British) world order.

Poland likewise watches these developments with growing alarm, despite being praised previously as a ‘model ally’. The unexpected cancellation in May 2026 of a planned deployment of 4,000 US troops shocked officials in Warsaw, where the risks posed by Russian aggression are that much greater (the Trump administration subsequently announced that 5,000 soldiers would be despatched there instead, following the backlash). The reassurance problem predates this president to some extent; consider, for example, the European reaction to President Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia in 2011, or the Biden administration’s unilateral withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. Scepticism about America’s staying power is not new, but it has intensified unquestionably on Trump’s watch.

Mindful of the Trump administration’s unilateralism and the propensity of its most senior officials to berate America’s closest partners, many scholars and analysts are bearish about the durability of America’s alliances. The overwhelming consensus is that most allies and partners will hedge their bets.

Interestingly, this is not the case for America’s core allies. Those in the Indo-Pacific and Europe – Australia, Japan, Poland and the UK – are deepening their links with one another, independently of the US but broadly in support of the principles underpinning the order that America has long championed. While these four are cognisant of the longstanding flaws in the US-led order and critical of the Trump administration, the alternatives are simply unpalatable. They are, therefore, taking steps to ensure China and Russia cannot carve out spheres of influence while US leadership wavers.

We can call this emerging pattern of behaviour ‘stewarding’: the practice by which core allies reinforce one another through lateral security agreements, defence-industrial partnerships and minilateral arrangements. This is distinct from hedging. As foreign policy experts Darren Lim and Zack Cooper contend, states hedge by sending signals designed to ‘generate ambiguity’ about their security commitments, ‘eschewing clear-cut alignment with any great power’. Stewarding, by contrast, follows a different path. States are not hedging against American power, but rather working to preserve what it built, even if Washington now shows little interest in it. The captain of the ship may be absent from the helm, but the lieutenants have stepped in to steer it clear of the rocky shoals.

What, then, are these allies doing in practice? The flurry of diplomacy is striking. The Northolt Treaty is the third major security pact the UK has signed with a European ally in less than a year. In July 2025, Britain and France, Europe’s only nuclear-armed states, issued the Northwood Declaration, pledging to deepen nuclear co-operation and affirming that there is ‘no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations’. That same month, the UK finalised the Kensington Treaty with Germany. The British government also concluded the Geelong Treaty with Australia in 2025, insulating the bilateral dimension of the trilateral AUKUS defence pact from potential shocks emanating from Washington.

These initiatives follow the 2023 Hiroshima Accord between the UK and Japan, which allowed for reciprocal access to military bases and included a consultation clause in the event of external aggression. Both governments also reiterated that they are each other’s most important partners in their respective regions. Poland, for its part, has struck notable agreements with France and Germany within the past two years, as well as strategic partnerships with Canada and Sweden.

The war in Ukraine intensified this stewarding behaviour in Europe. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the UK pledged to defend Finland and Sweden should either be attacked, providing cover until both came under NATO’s protective shield in 2023 and 2024, respectively. This was an act of regional stewardship – reinforcing European security at a moment of acute uncertainty without waiting for Washington to lead. More recently, France and the UK have floated the idea of leading a postwar reassurance force in Ukraine. Together with Germany, they both form part of the E3 dialogue to provide a powerful European voice on international flashpoints; this has since been expanded to include Italy and Poland on matters relating to Ukraine.

Beyond diplomatic statements, stewarding is visible in tangible defence cooperation. The UK and Germany now head the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, having assumed responsibility from the US for co-ordinating the delivery of weapons and training to Kyiv. London is increasingly positioning itself as a convening power in Europe. It leads the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a 10-state grouping designed to improve military interoperability outside NATO’s formal command structures. In April 2026, First Sea Lord General Sir Gwyn Jenkins announced plans to extend this through a ‘Northern Navies initiative’ – a multinational maritime force to defend Northwest Europe and the High North, with the Royal Navy at its heart. Underscoring the logic of stewarding (as opposed to hedging), he explained that ‘it should not be seen as separate to NATO [and, by extension, the United States], but rather complementary to it’.

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a trilateral endeavour between Italy, Japan and the UK to develop a sixth-generation fighter, offers the most concrete example of stewarding. From the outset, the three partners conceptualised the project as more than conventional defence collaboration. Rather, they framed it around ‘upholding the rules-based, free and open international order’, aspiring for it to become ‘a cornerstone of global security’. Crucially, they emphasised ‘future interoperability’ with the US, demonstrating that stewarding reflects a form of alignment, rather than ambiguity. It is notable that GCAP was one of the few beneficiaries of the Labour government’s recent Defence Investment Plan, illustrating the programme’s cross-party support in the UK.

Poland, meanwhile, is forging defence-industrial links with South Korea, another US ally. Both states recognise the security relations between Europe and the Indo-Pacific – underscored by the presence of North Korean soldiers in neighbouring Ukraine. Warsaw is acquiring nearly 300 Chunmoo artillery systems and up to 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks from Seoul. These are more than simple arms deals, as they involve significant technology transfer; Poland is set to become the European hub for K2 and Chunmoo production. Last year, both foreign ministers hailed their ‘deep and wide’ partnership, which is ‘all the more valuable as we navigate an increasingly turbulent geopolitical landscape’. Such initiatives illustrate how core US allies are building a web of lateral security relationships, which reinforces the existing order independently of Washington, but broadly in line with the principles it has long upheld.

There is, however, a potential weak spot in stewarding: its prospects depend on allied cohesion and sustained investment, both of which are vulnerable to the whims of domestic politics. The Iran War exposed the parlous state of the British armed forces, with only one destroyer able to deploy to the region – and belatedly at that. The wrangling between the UK Treasury and the Ministry of Defence over the Defence Investment Plan further underscores the continued reluctance to return military spending to Cold War levels, despite Europe’s deteriorating security environment. Poland, by contrast, is investing nearly five per cent of GDP in defence, though it starts from a lower base and has a long way to go before turning złoty into hard capabilities. Thus, while the logic of stewarding is sound, expectations need to be managed.

These limitations partly explain why these allies have not abandoned all co-operation with the US, despite polemical calls from some quarters to de-couple from Washington entirely. If anything, they are doubling down on the US, while pursuing a complementary stewarding strategy. All four are spending more on defence, with American equipment earmarked for much of this new funding. In Europe, Poland is acquiring F-35 fighters, HIMARS missile systems and Abrams tanks.

The UK, meanwhile, is purchasing F-35As specifically to participate in NATO’s nuclear-sharing mission using US B61 bombs, deepening its reliance on Washington for the reconstituted second arm of its nuclear deterrent. The ‘crown jewels’ of the Anglo-American alliance – the institutional intelligence-sharing and nuclear relationships – endure at the deep, bureaucratic level, despite occasional tensions at the surface between political masters.

The AUKUS defence pact, which involves the transfer of sensitive nuclear propulsion technology, continues at ‘full steam’ according to Trump. As part of its second pillar, Australia, the UK and the US are collaborating across a range of emerging technologies, with recent progress made on undersea warfare. Such behaviour is what separates Australia, Japan, Poland and the UK from other US allies and partners who are beginning to hedge – that is, distancing themselves from Washington while strengthening ties with its rivals. These core allies, then, are combining two approaches: binding tighter to Washington, while building lateral co-operation with one another to uphold deterrence in key regions.

If Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is to be believed, the US-led order is already sinking – with many allies and partners jumping ship. Yet America’s core allies are not scrambling for lifeboats. Rather than abandoning ship, they are reinforcing the vessel – through lateral security agreements and defence-industrial partnerships, as well as sustained investment in the US alliance itself. Whether stewarding or hedging proves the wiser course remains to be seen. For now, at least, the lieutenants of the US-led order are keeping the ship afloat.