The place of beauty

Does beauty arise in ourselves as observing subjects or is it to be found outside ourselves, in beautiful objects? Perhaps the focus should be on the relationship between the two.

Two Men Contemplating the Moon, 1819–20, by Caspar David Friedrich.
Two Men Contemplating the Moon, 1819–20, by Caspar David Friedrich. Credit: mambo

In his BBC radio series A History of the World in 100 Objects, Neil MacGregor made an intriguing observation about the earliest artefacts fashioned by human beings: ‘As soon as we start making things, we start making beautiful things… it looks as though even one and a half million years ago we want things to be beautiful, we want them to be complicated, and we want that, apparently, just as much as wanting them to be fit for purpose.’

For many people, the search for beauty is a dominating theme of their lives. Some may not be prompted by the encounter to ask what lies behind it. But there are others who may wonder about beauty itself and ask questions about it – philosophical questions. Plato wrote that the origin of philosophy is wonder, and to wonder at beauty is the branch of philosophy known as aesthetics.

Why is there beauty in the world, rather than no beauty? Where does beauty come from, and how do we account for its existence in the first place? What is the difference between something which is beautiful and something which is not? Problems of this sort were first raised at the genesis of philosophy in ancient Greece. As soon as people began to articulate philosophical questions, they started posing philosophical questions about beauty.

Two contrasting answers to these questions may be identified at the outset. Both are extreme, though there is more that can be said in favour of the first than the second.

The first answer asserts that humans’ sense of beauty is an expression of their longing for the divine, indeed it provides a strong argument for God’s existence. This argument may strike many as unfashionable, but it has an ancient lineage. CS Lewis, a devout polemicist, wrote that the feeling we experience when we contemplate a beautiful object is not to be understood as ultimately deriving from the thing itself. In The Weight of Glory, he argued that beauty is ‘only the scent of a flower we have not found, the echo of a tune we have not heard, news from a country we have never visited’. Lewis here simultaneously postulates the existence of God and purports to find in Him a sufficient explanation of beauty, which, viewed in isolation, he regards as a deceptive simulacrum.

There is a lack of nuance in this which some may instinctively resist. Is not an atheist as well able to respond to beauty as a devout believer? On the other hand, the ultimate source of Lewis’ thesis is Plato and his followers, and one should therefore be slow to dismiss it out of hand. There may be a more subtle, less muscular version of the argument which, purged of its false dichotomy, leads one in the end to a not dissimilar conclusion.

The second extreme answer to the question why there is beauty in the world can be dealt with more summarily. It is this: that our sense of beauty is simply a by-product of evolution, a useful way in which natural selection can operate, by co-opting animals’ and humans’ aesthetic sensibilities in the service of sexual reproduction and of that tired old strand of anthropomorphised DNA, the selfish gene. In other words, beauty is an instrument of utility; it exists because it is useful.

A moment’s thought reveals that this materialist argument is completely inadequate, for it raises the question: why is there beauty in the first place? Of course, given the existence of beauty, it can be put to use. Darwin himself, so often a far clearer and humbler thinker than the neo-Darwinians who claim to be his followers, saw the problem. ‘How the sense of beauty in its simplest form… was first developed in the mind of man and of the lower animals is a very obscure subject… how [it] was first acquired, – we do not know.’

Moreover, the sheer overabundance, the emotional and spiritual excess of our reaction to beauty is not readily explained by reproductive utility. This large surplus of human feeling is not a biological tool, but a defining characteristic of our rational and moral nature.

These preliminary explanations leave open a wide expanse of middle ground, and some rather large unresolved questions. A natural path towards answering some of them entails trying to locate beauty. Where is it to be found? Does it arise in ourselves as observing subjects or is it to be found outside ourselves, in beautiful objects? Or both? Or neither?

At the dawn of aesthetics in fourth-century BC Greece, Plato and his followers located beauty outside the individual. His celebrated account situates beauty in the realm of the Forms. Plato postulated Forms as the abstract, absolute and unchangeable essences of all things, which objects and matter in the physical world merely participate in, exemplify or resemble. Indeed, there is in the case of beauty an overlap between its Form (capital F) and the belief among the Greeks that individual beautiful objects in the world possess certain physical attributes, and that those attributes derive from their form (lower case f).

Thus, certain proportions were identified as reliable indicia of beauty, and Plato wrote in the Philebus that ‘measure and proportion are everywhere identified with beauty and virtue’. The sculptor Polykleitos had in the previous century written a treatise, the Canon, proposing that the classical conception of beauty entailed an arrangement of integral parts into a coherent whole, according to proportion, harmony and symmetry.

If beauty resides in form and proportion, it must be a property which inheres in the beautiful object. In other words, on this account, beauty is an objective property, albeit derived from other, simpler objective properties. Nonetheless, it did not take long before philosophers detected that treating proportion as a necessary attribute of beauty had the effect of excluding from the realm of the beautiful all sorts of things that they might wish to include within it. The neo-Platonist Plotinus, writing in the third century AD, argued that since proportion and symmetry required there to be parts in order for them to be proportionate to or symmetrical with each other, any theory, such as his own, which reposed ultimate beauty and truth in a supreme, transcendent and immutable One proved the inadequacy of the previous canonical view.

Thereafter, first the Renaissance and then the Enlightenment established that, in Pope’s phrase, the proper study of mankind was Man (not God). The Copernican revolution displaced the divinely appointed Aristotelian model of the cosmos. Philosophy, through Locke and Berkeley, moved inexorably towards an empiricism which gave precedence to the point of view of the observer: knowledge was not implanted by the Deity, nor was it the product of pure reason; rather it had to be derived from experience. The important point was that the subject had moved to the centre of the stage, and the location of beauty had moved with it.

The full flowering of empiricism is encapsulated in the sceptical position adopted by David Hume: ‘Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.’ Kant had fundamental disagreements with Hume, but here he is on the same page: ‘The judgement of taste’, he wrote, ‘can be no other than subjective.’

Was that then the end of the debate? Was beauty after all merely in the eye of the beholder? The answer, as so often in philosophy, seemed to be yes and no. For no sooner were Hume and Kant arguing that beauty was a matter of subjective opinion than they started hedging their bets. If beauty was treated as merely a subjective state, it ceased to be a paramount value, if it was indeed a value at all. They also had to concede that when controversies arise about the beauty of particular things such as works of art, convincing arguments can sometimes be advanced; some reasons are better than others. Moreover, the opinions of certain people on aesthetic questions are generally accorded more weight than those of others.

Kant in particular struggled with the paradox or ‘antinomy’ that whereas our reaction to beauty is one of subjective experience, it is expressed in the form of a judgement, which requires that others ought to agree with us; in his phrase, we are ‘suitors for agreement’. And yet most people would embrace the paradox, if such it be, that beauty does partake of both subjective and objective elements.

Later schools of philosophy pushed the subjectivist approach to beauty yet further. Thus, the positivist school in 20th-century analytical philosophy asserted that words such as ‘beauty’ are meaningless or without cognitive content, being merely expressions of subjective approval. However, the argument that we can say nothing about beauty because it is not a fact encounters grave difficulties when one replaces aesthetic judgements with ethical ones (about which the positivists said the same thing). That redoubtable quartet of female Oxford philosophers – Elizabeth Anscombe (Wittgenstein’s disciple), Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch – was driven by the horrors of the first newsreels from Belsen into a rejection of the so-called emotivist theory and a reassertion of the objective nature of right and wrong. That the Final Solution was an unmitigated evil was not, they argued, simply a matter of opinion. The same objection can be made in the aesthetic sphere. It just does not accord with our everyday experience to treat beauty as a mere internal opinion or reaction.

While people differ in particular judgements, no one can reasonably deny that their judgements coincide to a remarkable extent: it would be perverse to deny that a rose or a dramatic sunset is beautiful. As stated, it is possible for two people to argue about whether something is beautiful, for one person to try to show another that it is beautiful, or to learn from someone else why it is beautiful. These possibilities strongly suggest that there is some external corpus of values or responses to which a rational appeal can be made, and therefore that beauty cannot be explained in purely subjective terms.

Even philosophers are permitted to grant that the value of certain ideas depends on their practical effects. As mature adults, we are content to live our lives making certain claims which we cannot prove, but which undoubtedly work. As part of his pragmatist philosophy, William James used to refer to the ‘cash-value’ of an idea, meaning its practical, real-world consequences. Deprecating the attempted extermination of an entire race by poison gas would seem to be a case in point. The same is true in the sphere of aesthetics. We can make claims and live our lives by those claims, even if we cannot prove them to standards of rigour pre-ordained by academics.

It may be that the premise concealed behind the argument over whether beauty is subjective or objective turns out to be false. Who says it has to be either one or the other? Might it not be both? Or neither? Niels Bohr maintained that the opposite of a profound truth is also a profound truth. The possibility emerges that, in order to locate beauty, the choice is not between an internal state of mind and an external property, but the focus should instead be on the relationship between the two, between the mind that perceives and the object that is perceived. There are many things that have their essence in the relations or spaces between things, rather than in the things themselves. (Music provides an irrefutable example.) This is what Eliot called the stillness between two waves of the sea.

One might go further. Maybe the world as a whole is composed not of things – objects which range from particles to human beings, or entities which have their corresponding Platonic Forms – but of relationships. In his book The Matter with Things, Iain McGilchrist builds on mathematician AN Whitehead’s process philosophy to make the claim that relationships are more important than relata (the things related) and indeed are ontologically prior to them.

Among contemporary philosophers, it was Roger Scruton who perhaps had the most to say about beauty, not just beauty in the context of art forms in which he was particularly interested – architecture and music – but beauty itself. He was especially interested in how we reach judgements about beauty, how beauty fits in with fundamental aspects of our condition, and in the benefits and consolations which it confers on fallen humanity. He wrote less about the fundamental ontology of beauty, by which is meant the sort of questions posed earlier: where does beauty come from, and how do we account for its existence in the first place? But what he did say, albeit at the risk of over-simplification and excessive formalism, can be reduced to ten propositions.

1. Beauty is real. It is not an illusion. On the contrary, it is a transcendental value and like truth and goodness it is a fundamental aspect of being itself. Beauty is therefore woven into the fabric of the universe.

2. As a corollary of 1., Scruton vigorously rejected the cynical claims of relativism, which asserts that everything is of equal aesthetic value (or lack of value), and therefore that setting any store by such value is a waste of time.

3. True beauty cannot be faked. In this it is unique, different even from the other foundational values of truth and goodness. Beauty carries within itself its own irrefutable verification. The ignorant and the credulous may fall for substitute beauty, which Scruton called ‘kitsch’, but it cannot fool the person who knows how to look.

4. The essence of the experience of beauty is to confer a sense of pleasure on the beholder. ‘We call something beautiful’, Scruton said, ‘when we gain pleasure from contemplating it as an individual object, for its own sake, and in its presented form.’ By this he meant that the aesthetic pleasure in question, while fundamentally non-conceptual, is not merely sensory, immediate and intuitive, but derives from the context in which the object comes before us.

5. The phrase ‘pleasure… for its own sake’ picks up an essential point made originally by Leibniz and the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury and then more forcefully by Kant: the pleasure felt in the contemplation of beauty is disinterested.

a. The appreciation of beauty is an end in itself, not a means. Marcus Aurelius said that ‘anything in any way beautiful derives its beauty from itself’. The message of the flower is the flower. Beauty is an ontological primitive, incapable of reduction or explication in other terms, save perhaps insofar as it partakes in the central concept of Scruton’s philosophy, namely the sacred (as to which see below).

b. Humanity’s response to beauty has nothing to do with the satisfaction of its grosser appetites. We do not covet Bach’s B minor Mass. As Scruton observed in a BBC programme he made in 2009 (Why Beauty Matters), when a mother looks in wonder upon the face of her infant child, she does not want to eat it, or to conduct scientific experiments on it. Beauty therefore has nothing to do with utility.

6. On the issue of disinterestedness, Kant went so far as to say that the viewer is ultimately indifferent to the very existence of the beautiful object. Scruton disagreed: he drew a parallel between the experience of beauty and the experience of love.

7. The close connection between these two experiences has certain profound consequences relevant to beauty.

a. Both experiences are fundamentally concerned with relationships, and in particular what Scruton, following Buber, called I-Thou relationships. I-Thou relationships are personal (unlike I-It relationships, which are denotative). The engagement in both cases is with the physical actuality of the other, and the key fact is that both the subject and the object share an existence, a presence in the world – a view far from the disembodied asexuality of Kant.

b. It follows that the beautiful work of art is irreplaceable and unsubstitutable. In the case of the object of beauty, no other will do.

c. Our interest in beauty is inexhaustible. To quote Scruton: ‘there is no point at which [our] desire could be satisfied, nor is there any action, process or whatever, following which the desire is over and done with… Here is a want without a goal: a desire that cannot be fulfilled since there is nothing that would count as its fulfilment.’

d. We therefore return again and again to beautiful things as we do to people whom we love. In some ways (as Scruton says) they are like liturgies, the whole point of which is to repeat. Such acts of repetition, like beauty itself, feed the human need to experience a different sense of time – time as kairos rather than chronos; no longer the ticking clock, but instead the unmeasured extension of what Bergson called la durée réelle.

8. For these reasons, the pursuit of beauty is a moral act. This is not just because the aesthetic good has an association with the ethical good through the transcendental trio of beauty, truth and goodness, but because Scruton believed that, while the human condition is inherently marked by adversity and suffering, the pursuit of beauty acts as a moral remedy: beautiful art does not deny our suffering; instead, it validates and transforms it, offering emotional consolation, hope and a sense of the sacred. To bring beauty into a broken world is therefore an act of love and moral stewardship.

9. The sacred dimension of life was the heart of Scruton’s philosophy. This sacred dimension has three principal components.

a. The home is sacred because it is the place where human beings establish meaning, order and sanctuary and towards which they therefore exhibit piety.

b. Monogamous sexual love is sacred because it entails the complete and self-giving mutual recognition of two embodied persons.

c. Beauty is sacred because, in conferring a sense of the otherworldly and the transcendental, it grants a brief glimpse into eternity, providing assurance that we truly belong in the universe and prefiguring a final, sacred home.

The difference between CS Lewis’ conception of beauty and Scruton’s is therefore this. For Lewis, there was as it were a linear relationship between the human subject, the beautiful object and God; the Christian God stands behind the beautiful object and the gravitational pull towards that object is in truth an attraction towards God conceived in this sense. Scruton’s position was more complex. At the end of his BBC programme, he posited the view that religion could as well be seen as a substitute for beauty as beauty could be seen as a substitute for religion; but ‘better still, why describe the two as rivals? The sacred and the beautiful stand side-by-side: two doors that open onto a single space, and in that space we find our home’. Whatever he meant by invoking that home, Scruton probably did not believe in Lewis’ God in the ontological sense of a separate, transcendent entity which exists in addition to the material world; it seems from many of his writings, not least his final book on Parsifal, that his sense of the sacred required no Easter Sunday to complete the sacrifice of Good Friday.

10. The experience of beauty is in the end incapable of articulation in words. Emerson said that beauty escapes all analysis; ‘it instantly deserts possession’. We receive what Wordsworth called ‘intimations’ of what beauty signifies.

Scruton’s survey of the phenomenon of beauty covers most of the ground, but two further elements may be identified.

First, a couplet from Goethe:

‘Warum bin ich vergänglich, o Zeus?’, so fragte die Schönheit. / ‘Macht ich doch’, sagte der Gott, ‘nur das Vergängliche schön’.

In literal translation: ‘Why am I transient, O Zeus?’ asked Beauty. ‘Because,’ said the god, ‘it was only the transient that I made beautiful.’ The aphorism goes on: ‘And Love, and the flowers, and the dew, and Youth itself, heard this, and all of them walked away, weeping, from Jupiter’s throne.’

What is the relationship between our experience of beauty and the fact that we are bound in passing time? If we had an infinite amount of time, would we respond to beauty? Surely, the flower that we know to be ephemeral possesses a preciousness derived from that very fact; we cling to what we are about to lose. Our sense of its beauty, in part at least, is an anticipatory act of mourning. More profound than Keats’ better-known line about beauty is his epithet in Ode on Melancholy, where he calls it ‘Beauty that must die’.

What then, it may be objected, of our contemplation of something more permanent, like a Greek statue? Here the situation is reversed, for in this situation it is our own transience of which we become painfully aware. We implicitly compare the statue’s durability with our own transitory lives, and we find something inexpressibly moving about the fact that this beautiful artefact has somehow endured as we cannot endure, though this thought carries with it the knowledge that the statue too will finally perish.

Secondly, it has previously been stated that Scruton did not write much about the ontology of beauty. There are however those who have ventured further. Notable in this respect is the thesis put forward by McGilchrist in The Matter with Things. He sees the sense of beauty as ‘something creative and reciprocal, undetermined and utterly beyond all utility, in which we and the divine cosmos interact in something like an unending dance, a dance in which the good, the true and the beautiful become ever more manifest’.

McGilchrist makes three main points: that consciousness, not matter, is the ultimate stuff of the universe; that values such as beauty, truth and goodness are consubstantial and interdependent with consciousness and, like it, are fundamental; and that the production of beauty is inherent in and indeed is the ultimate goal of the universe.

The first point – that consciousness is an irreducible, primordial and omnipresent field permeating the entire cosmos, not a ‘thing’ as such, but an active, creative process – has these elements.

1. Reductive materialism asserts that consciousness emerges from non-conscious matter when the latter reaches a specific level of biological complexity (like a human brain). Tt is no accident, however, that decades of science have utterly failed to solve the so-called hard problem of consciousness. As Schrödinger thought, it is logically impossible to derive subjective experience as some sort of secretion from matter that inherently lacks it; you cannot get something from nothing.

2. Following in the steps of Planck, Schrödinger again and Bohr, McGilchrist argues that matter does not consist of solid, independent bits of stuff, but that it is a specific phase or manifestation of consciousness.

3. The brain does not emit consciousness in the way that a kettle emits steam. Instead, McGilchrist adopts a transmissive or more accurately permissive theory whereby the brain acts as a filter or a reducing valve that restrains, shapes and localises the universal field of consciousness so that we can function in a physical body.

4. What primarily exists in the universe are not isolated things but relationships. Individual entities (relata) only emerge out of a pre-existing web of relationships.

As a second main point, McGilchrist contends that values such as beauty, truth and goodness are interdependent with consciousness. He rejects the materialist claim that values are merely subjective, evolutionary constructs that humans invent and paint onto an indifferent universe. Instead, he views these values as ontological primitives – fundamental elements built into the structure of being itself. These values are discovered by humans, not invented. Values intrinsically depend on relationships. Goodness is not a set of rules in a book, but an attitude of the soul towards the world; beauty likewise. The very etymology of the word truth shows that it is a disposition of trust towards reality.

In the third and most far-reaching element of his argument, McGilchrist takes as his text a remark by Whitehead: ‘The teleology of the universe is directed to the production of beauty.’ Because the universe is an interconnected web of consciousness tending towards richer, more profound relationships, the production of beauty is the natural culmination of this cosmic evolution. Humans (and other conscious organisms) are not therefore accidental observers of a dead cosmos. Rather they act as the specialised organs of the universe, capable of reflecting, articulating and actively co-creating that beauty. On this view, when we appreciate art, nature and harmony, we are directly fulfilling the universe’s ultimate reason for being.

By weaving his ontology of consciousness together with the process philosophy of Whitehead, McGilchrist (like Whitehead) concludes that the universe does not just have the appearance of purpose (as many physicists concede), but that it actually is purpose-driven and that its ultimate goal is the manifestation of beauty.

It has been argued that beauty is neither a purely subjective chemical reaction to a meaningless universe – a pattern created inside a human skull – nor an independent, static property sitting out in space, existing whether we are there or not. Both scientific materialism and naive realism are misconceived. The universe is not a lifeless, self-sufficient object that can be photographed from nowhere. To say that it is beautiful whether or not it is viewed by a subject is just as wrong as saying that beauty is merely in the eye of the beholder. Beauty waits to be summoned into fullness of being by human contemplation.

Reality is therefore relational, and those relations matter more than the things between which they exist. We conventionally insist on describing beauty as either the product of a mind here or inherent within an object of contemplation there. Instead we should be conceiving it in dynamic terms, more like a reverberative force field than a set of billiard balls, and, as such, intrinsically resistant to articulation and exegesis: implicit, elusive, ineffable, but so powerful that many of us spend most of our lives in pursuit of it. For in beauty we sense that the ultimate and redemptive oneness of existence is to be found.

Poetry and imagery convey meaning in this area more nearly than prose or philosophy. Even the mathematics of quantum physics must yield to poetry, for as Bohr said to Heisenberg: ‘When it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet is not nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images and establishing mental connections.’ Two final metaphors, both deployed in The Matter with Things, may communicate more nearly where beauty lies ontologically and, more particularly, in what spirit we should seek it.

John Donne’s poem ‘The Extasie’ envisages a pair of lovers gazing on each other with this image: ‘Our eye-beams twisted, and did thred / Our eyes, upon one double string.’ The poet conveys that it is in the relationship between these two individuals that everything which matters is happening. Written centuries earlier, Buddhist scriptures describe an image wherein the god Indra casts a net which encompasses the entire universe, and in which all that exists is connection. At each point of connection within the net, there sits a radiant jewel, like a drop of dew on a spider’s web; and on the surface of each jewel the light from all the other jewels in the universe is reflected.

This is an abridged and adapted version of a lecture given to the Roger Scruton Summer School in July 2026. The complete speech can be read at jonathangaisman.co.uk

Author

Jonathan Gaisman

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