Why the Gulf states won’t side with America

Tensions between the United States and Iran have reached a new fever-pitch following a reported Iranian drone strike on a US-owned gas storage vessel at Egypt’s Port of Damietta and missile attacks on US forces stationed in Jordan, prompting American retaliatory airstrikes against Iranian targets. The attacks, coupled with renewed Houthi threats to blockade the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, have heightened concerns over the security of the maritime routes that facilitate the uninterrupted transit of Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas exports to global markets, including through the Suez Canal. For the Gulf monarchies the potential for a widening conflict raises profound concerns over their economic security and their strategic weakness in the face of Iranian pressure. Continued disruption to maritime trade routes threatens the energy exports, foreign investment and regional stability upon which their long-term development plans depend.

Yet, despite the escalating violence, the Trump administration has continued to pursue a dual-track strategy of military pressure and diplomatic engagement. President Trump’s decision to postpone a significant wave of retaliatory strikes against Iran, in order to allow additional time for diplomatic negotiations, came amid the most serious deterioration in US-Iran relations since the signing of the Washington-Tehran Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 17 June.

The initial trigger for the collapse of the MoU was Iran’s continued targeting of commercial shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, prompting a renewed cycle of tit-for-tat airstrikes with the United States, including attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait, both of which host US bases. In response, Trump remarked in frustration: ‘I think it’s over. I don’t want to deal with them anymore’, signalling that the ceasefire between Washington and Tehran had effectively collapsed, even as indirect negotiations continued through Qatari and Pakistani mediation.

The deterioration in the security situation was further underscored when Trump announced that the United States would reinstate a naval blockade on Iran and prevent ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports. Trump additionally claimed that Washington would be ‘reimbursed’ at a rate of 20 per cent for securing safe passage for commercial cargo vessels transiting the Gulf, although the operational details and seriousness of the proposal were unclear. The escalation between Washington and Tehran reached its apogee when Iran launched a series of co-ordinated missile and drone strikes against American installations and critical infrastructure across the Gulf, killing three American service members at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan on 17 July.

The collapse of the MoU, the renewed military escalation, and the inconsistency of Washington’s response, exemplified by President Trump’s reversal of his proposed transit fees, emphasises the central strategic dilemma confronting the Gulf monarchies in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury. Despite decades of American military predominance in the Gulf, the conflict demonstrated Washington’s inability to fully shield its regional partners and their critical infrastructure from sustained Iranian attacks, as the Islamic Republic continues to hold the Strait of Hormuz, dictating the rules of the game to its weaker neighbours. This was perhaps best represented when Iran held the long-delayed, multi-day funeral ceremonies for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike.

Delegations from nearly every Gulf state – including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and Kuwait – travelled to Tehran to pay their respects, with the notable exception of the United Arab Emirates, which declined to send a senior official delegation. Their participation reflected neither ideological affinity nor support for Iran’s regional policies. Rather, it reflected a calculation rooted in realpolitik: despite the damage inflicted during Operation Epic Fury, Tehran remained an indispensable regional actor, whose ability to shape the Gulf’s security environment could not be ignored.

Much of the commentary following Operation Epic Fury has focused on the military dimension. Israel and the United States showed unprecedented operational capabilities, projected overwhelming force and inflicted significant damage on Iran’s military infrastructure. Judged solely on tactical and operational grounds, the campaign was undeniably impressive.

This, however, is not how the Arab Gulf monarchies assess the outcome of wars. For Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha and the other Gulf capitals, the ultimate measure of success is not the number of targets destroyed, commanders eliminated or missiles intercepted. Rather, it is whether the use of force produced a more stable and secure regional order. By that standard, the picture in late July is difficult to characterise as anything other than a significant strategic disappointment.

From the Gulf perspective, the conflict did not fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. Despite suffering extensive military and economic damage, Tehran retained the coercive capabilities that matter most to Gulf policymakers: the ability to threaten energy infrastructure, disrupt maritime trade, activate proxy networks and impose recurring costs on its neighbours. For the Gulf monarchies, these enduring capabilities matter far more than Iran’s battlefield losses, because they continue to define the region’s security balance.

Nothing illustrates this better than Iran’s enduring leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s asymmetric strategy relies on its geographic advantage and its understanding that it does not need to permanently close the Strait to achieve its objectives. Rather, a single attack on commercial shipping, energy infrastructure or maritime traffic can generate uncertainty, sharply increase insurance premiums, disrupt shipping patterns and impose significant costs on global trade flows through the Persian Gulf. This strategy has been aided by Iran’s founding of the Persian Gulf Strait Association (PGSA), which seeks to institutionalise Tehran’s control over the Strait by creating a formal mechanism for regulating maritime transit and collecting tolls from commercial vessels.

Through these efforts, Iran aims to translate its geographic advantage over the Strait of Hormuz into broader political and strategic leverage over the neighbouring Gulf states. In Tehran’s view, control over the Strait is not merely a maritime advantage, but a means of exploiting the Gulf monarchies’ underlying weakness, which Iran has long regarded as the region’s ‘soft underbelly’, the vulnerable point through which it can pressure its adversaries and dictate the terms of regional order. Despite their wealth and advanced infrastructure, the Gulf states remain exposed due to their dependence on energy exports, international tourism, maritime trade and a longstanding need for external security guarantees provided by the United States.

The war also exposed uncomfortable truths regarding the limits of American power. For decades, US military presence and security commitments have served as the foundation of regional stability for the Gulf monarchies. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the announcement of the Carter Doctrine in 1980, Washington effectively established itself as the external guarantor of security in the Persian Gulf, pledging to prevent any outside power from dominating the region and signalling its willingness to use force to protect vital American interests and its Gulf allies.

Yet, in recent years, confidence in the reliability of the American security umbrella has eroded. Iran’s September 2019 attacks on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais represented a turning point. Despite the extensive US military presence in the region, Washington proved unable to prevent a devastating strike against critical energy infrastructure and did not respond following the attacks. The episode reinforced concerns in the Gulf regarding the limits of American protection and contributed to a reassessment of their regional strategies. Rather than relying exclusively on Washington, Gulf states increasingly pursued diplomatic engagement with Tehran, culminating in the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement brokered by China in March 2023 and the restoration of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. The United Arab Emirates similarly moved toward normalisation, restoring ambassador-level ties with Iran in 2023 after years of downgraded relations.

This shift reflected a broader strategic calculation: while the United States remains the Gulf monarchies’ indispensable security partner, indispensability should not be confused with omnipotence. The current conflict has reinforced doubts about Washington’s ability to impose a durable regional order and illustrated that American power alone cannot eliminate their vulnerability to Iranian coercion.

The result has been a more pronounced hedging strategy, maintaining close security ties with Washington while simultaneously seeking accommodation with Tehran to mitigate the risks of future conflict. Rather than choosing between Washington and Beijing, confrontation and diplomacy, deterrence and engagement, Gulf leaders increasingly pursue all these simultaneously in a multi-aligned manner. They continue investing heavily in their partnerships with the United States, all while maintaining dialogue with Iran, expanding indigenous defence capabilities, diversifying external partnerships and reducing strategic dependence on any single power.

At the heart of this approach lies the Gulf monarchies’ pursuit of domestic transformation and security, which makes regional stability their overriding strategic priority. Their national agendas, most notably Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, depend on economic diversification, foreign direct investment in tourism, logistics and artificial intelligence, as well as the continued strength of their hydrocarbon sectors. These ambitions all require a stable regional environment, which has now been threatened by prolonged conflict. It was for this reason, that in the preceding weeks before the outbreak of war in February, the Gulf states worked feverishly to de-escalate tensions with Iran, fearing the consequences of a sustained conflict.

Most indicative of this hedging approach has been the trajectory of the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf state with perhaps the most antagonistic relationship with Iran. The UAE absorbed the largest share of Iranian missile and drone attacks during the conflict and initially responded with direct strikes against Iranian targets. Yet Abu Dhabi quickly recalibrated its approach, recognising that continued confrontation with Tehran risked undermining its economic interests as it steadily and covertly rebuilt its economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran, even as the current ceasefire has unravelled.

This, despite Abu Dhabi deepening its security ties with the United States and Israel, underscores the pragmatism that the Gulf monarchies are likely to show to manage the realities of Iran’s regional influence. The result is that the Gulf policymakers view success not through the prism of damage inflicted on Iran, but by whether circumstances are conducive to long-term economic transformation, which requires a stable and durable regional order. By this standard, the war has fallen short.

The broader lesson extends well beyond the Gulf. Modern conflicts increasingly reveal a widening gap between tactical success and their ability to bring about lasting strategic change, as superior military performance does not automatically translate into favourable political and strategic outcomes. During Operation Epic Fury, Iran absorbed significant military damage, but it maintained its coercive capabilities and enhanced its ability to shape and dictate the terms of the regional order. Meanwhile, the Gulf monarchies found themselves facing the same fundamental predicament that existed before the war: dependence on an external power that cannot fully guarantee their security, all while having their critical infrastructure attacked by Iran to no avail.

This reality is likely to accelerate a trend already underway in the Gulf: a move toward greater multi-alignment and strategic hedging. Rather than choosing between Washington and Tehran, or placing exclusive reliance on any single external power, the Gulf monarchies will continue to diversify their partnerships, deepen security ties with the United States, expand economic and diplomatic engagement with China and other emerging powers, and pursue pragmatic channels with Iran to reduce the risk of future confrontation.

Their objective is not victory over Iran or reconciliation with it, but the preservation of strategic autonomy in an increasingly uncertain regional and international environment. As a result, Operation Epic Fury highlighted both the limits of military force in reshaping regional realities and the inability of the Gulf monarchies to rely exclusively on their American security patron to guarantee their long-term stability.